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Article 5

MAKING ROOM FOR COOPERATIVE INNOVATION
LIZA S. VERTINSKY
ABSTRACT
Patent law, created in response to a constitutional mandate to encourage innovation,
may be discouraging important forms of cooperative innovation. Advances in technology
have enabled new ways of pooling knowledge and computational capabilities, facilitating
cooperation among many participants with complementary skills and motivations to collectively solve complex problems. But emerging models of cooperative innovation increasingly
run into patent roadblocks.
Why might patent law sometimes thwart instead of support socially beneficial cooperative innovation? The problem lies in the tensions between the market-based incentives that
patent law creates and the mechanisms that support emerging models of cooperative innovation. The complexity and cost of solving contemporary public challenges are nudging diverse
participants together to collectively build their knowledge, but patents often serve to keep
them apart. While digital technologies enable new forms of massively distributed, open and
collaborative intellectual production, patents threaten the vitality and even the viability of
these promising types of innovation.
In this Article I use two examples—the risk of crowding out crowd science and the battle
between proprietary software companies and free open source software platforms—to illustrate how patent law in its current form may sometimes impede beneficial cooperation in
innovation. I then suggest how we might limit the negative effects of patents in contexts of
cooperative innovation without undermining the patent system.
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II. AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF INNOVATING ............................................................
A. Distinct Features of Cooperative Innovation .............................................
B. Two Examples ............................................................................................
1. Crowd Science: The Example of Foldit ................................................
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I. INTRODUCTION
“In the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too), those
who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed.”—Charles Darwin

Systems of decentralized, massively distributed open innovation
are emerging with increasing frequency and with the ability to harness new resources in powerful new ways.1 People with no prior in1. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Law, Policy, and Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 299 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A.
Moss eds., 2010); see also ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005). For a list
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volvement in biotechnology contribute hours of their time to solve
protein-folding puzzles posed by Foldit, an online video game that
uses crowd science to solve complex scientific problems.2 Data gathered from volunteer bird watchers through the global orthinological
network eBird are used to detect important environmental changes
that might otherwise go unnoticed.3 The U.S. Air Force is harnessing
collaborative online platforms to solicit input from students on complex
technological problems,4 and the National Institute of Health is enlisting the help of citizen scientist volunteers to collect and analyze data
from bacteria samples as part of the American Gut project.5 All of
these processes of crowd science rely on cooperation among many participants with diverse motivations and skills to collectively and openly
develop solutions to complex scientific or technological problems.6
Advances in technology have enabled greater computational capabilities and new ways of pooling knowledge. They have facilitated the
growth of massively distributed open access innovation processes
that rely upon voluntary participation by large numbers of people
who bring with them a diversity of skills and perspectives.7 These
participants share their ideas and discoveries openly with other
members of the innovation community in order to collectively and
cumulatively advance the innovation process. I refer to these kinds of
innovation processes as “cooperative innovation.” Cooperative innovation can harness underutilized and unused human resources and
combine existing disciplines and perspectives in new ways to solve
previously intractable scientific problems. In some cases it may comof some crowd science projects, see Citizen Science, SCI. AM., http://www.scientific
american.com/citizen-science/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
2. See The Science Behind Foldit, FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/info/about (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014).
3. Jim Robbins, Crowdsourcing, for the Birds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/science/earth/crowdsourcing-for-the-birds.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 (eBird aggregates data about bird sightings that could not be collected other than through individual observations and uses it to uncover changes in
the environment).
4. Jane L. Levere, Air Force Asks Students to Solve Real World Problems, N.Y. TIMES
(July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/business/media/air-force-asks-stud
ents-to-solve-real-world-problems.html.
5. See American Gut, HUMAN FOOD PROJECT, http://humanfoodproject.com/americangut/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
6. While these and other examples of what I am calling “cooperative innovation”
have important similarities, an equally important distinction can be drawn between
projects that rely primarily on cooperative data gathering, such as in the eBird and
American Gut project examples, and projects that involve cooperative problem solving and
free sharing of ideas, such as the Foldit and U.S. Air Force examples. The concerns that I
address in this paper apply most strongly to the latter cases, where at least some
participants are engaging in more than collecting data, although the lines between
activities that generate data and activities that lead to invention are often blurred.
7. See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 1; Benkler, supra note 1.
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plement existing modes of market-driven innovation, and in other
cases it may challenge them, increasing competition in important areas of intellectual production.8 However, emerging models of cooperative innovation sometimes run into patent roadblocks.
The problems that patents pose for cooperation in processes of
innovation are becoming difficult to ignore.9 The patent litigation
wars between major players in the smart phone industry such as
Apple, Samsung, Google, and Microsoft illustrate the divisive role
that patents can play in an industry that relies upon the shared
development and use of technology standards to achieve interoperability, particularly when network effects are important. By some
accounts Apple and Google now spend more on patent litigation than
they do on R&D.10 These problems are even greater for systems
of cooperative innovation such as open source software and crowd
science. Open source software systems like Linux challenge proprietary products like Microsoft Windows in the marketplace, only to
find their viability threatened by patent lawsuits.11 Ironically,
the open source software community finds it necessary to spend
substantial resources acquiring patents as a way of protecting free
software use.12 While harder to detect and measure, the problems
8. Scholars such as Yochai Benkler have argued that cooperative innovation is
valuable in itself, offering a way of democratizing innovation. In this article I am not
arguing that cooperative innovation is better than existing approaches, or even that
cooperation is always good. I am simply arguing that some kinds of cooperative innovation
have the potential to increase social welfare and deserve a chance to compete with
alternative approaches.
9. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010)
(describing the need to change IP law to accommodate new forms of collaborative intellectual production); Aija Leiponen & Justin Byma, If You Cannot Block, You Better Run:
Small Firms, Cooperative Innovation, and Appropriation Strategies, 38 RES. POL’Y 1478
(2009) (“Earlier research has emphasized patents and trade secrets as key strategies of
appropriation, yet these strategies do not appear to be very beneficial for small firms engaged in cooperative innovation. These results raise policy questions regarding the functionality of the existing system of intellectual property rights.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth
of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 709 (2012); Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving
Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861,
863-65 (2009) (arguing that current IP regimes are not designed to cope with changes in
the innovative process).
10. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stif
le-competition.html?pagewanted=all.
11. See Roger Parloff, Microsoft Takes on the Free World, FORTUNE (May 14, 2007, 9:35
AM), available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/05/28/
100033867/ (“Microsoft claims that free software like Linux, which runs a big chunk of
corporate America, violates 235 of its patents. It wants royalties from distributors and users.
Users like you, maybe.”).
12. See Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 47-48), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2289326); Keith Bergelt & William Wong, Interview: Keith Bergelt Discusses Open Invention
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that patents create for systems like Foldit that rely most heavily on
non-market mechanisms might prove to be even more costly. Patents
may interfere with the growth and vitality of these cooperative systems, limiting the opportunities that they provide for socially beneficial intellectual production.
Scholars of innovation such as Yochai Benkler and Eric von Hippel have already challenged us to consider what changes to the design of the legal and institutional system are necessary to sustain
cooperative innovation.13 They have identified intellectual property
law, particularly patent law, as threatening the open, inclusive and
collaborative nature of these systems. But they and other scholars
following in their wake have left the precise contours and magnitude
of the patent threats and specific proposals for patent law change for
further study.14 This Article responds to the challenge by identifying
and addressing specific ways in which patent law may interfere with
non-market mechanisms that support cooperative innovation. It focuses on three mechanisms that play a critical role in systems of cooperative innovation: trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity.15 Patents interfere with these mechanisms by increasing incentives for
group members to defect from the group and by increasing threats
from third parties against the group. This can make it harder to sustain the intrinsic motivations and the related norms of trust and sharing that cooperative systems rely upon, as well as increasing the cost
and risk of participation to potentially unsustainable levels. I argue
that courts should take these negative effects into account when fashioning patent remedies in contexts of cooperative innovation.16

Network, ELEC. DESIGN (Mar. 6, 2014), http://electronicdesign.com/embedded/interview-keithbergelt-discusses-open-invention-network.
13. “Policymakers . . . can design institutions and social systems to foster cooperation
by shaping social and psychological dynamics, rather than by focusing on individual incentives. The question then becomes, what aspects of the design of an institution or system—
be it technical platform, legal rule, business process, or policy intervention—are likely to
lead to a stable cooperative social dynamic?” Benkler, supra note 1, at 302; see also VON
HIPPEL, supra note 1.
14. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Intellectual Property at the Boundary (N.Y.U. Sch. of
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-60, 2013) (setting
out an agenda for investigating how IP rules impact cooperative innovation systems).
15. While these basic mechanisms seem to capture important ways in which
many cooperative systems operate, there are many other aspects of cooperative systems
that distinguish them from market-based systems, including a rich variety of non-economic
motivations and incentives for participating. For a discussion of the variety of incentives,
as well as some of the mechanisms, driving open source software systems, see, for
example, Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Open Source Software: The New
Intellectual Property Paradigm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ECON. & INFO. SYS. 285 (Terrence
Hendershott ed., 2006).
16. Preventing cooperation may, however, sometimes be socially desirable. See, e.g., F.
Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007); Klaus
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the potential of
cooperative innovation as an alternative to the traditional marketdriven approach. It provides two examples of cooperative innovation,
crowd science and open source software, to illustrate both the power
of cooperative systems and their vulnerabilities to patent threats.
Part II examines how and why patents may create problems for cooperative innovation.17 Part III shows how patent law could be adapted
to accommodate cooperative innovation through limited changes to
patent remedies. It provides three principles for contextualizing patent remedies in ways that respond to and limit the costs of patents
for socially beneficial cooperative innovation.18 These principles
would be triggered and applied by the courts only in contexts of cooperative innovation,19 leaving other areas of patent law unchanged.
Making room for cooperative innovation in this way will facilitate

Kultti et al., Patents Hinder Collusion (Helsinki Ctr. of Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No.
144, 2007); see also Jonathan Barnett, Dynamic Analysis of Intellectual Property: Theory,
Evidence and Policy (USC Gould Sch. of Law Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org. Res. Papers Series,
Research Paper No. C13-4, 2013) (noting that periods of weak patent protection may actually disadvantage new entrants).
17. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 9; see also Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus
Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010) (noting IP law has failed to recognize insights from psychology,
neurobiology and cultural research about how to promote creativity, resulting in laws
based on distorting stereotypes of creativity); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative
Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1999, 2000 (2011) (noting patents may have psychological effects that alter incentives
to innovate, particularly in collaborations); Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation,
106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 103 (2012) (examining collective patent licensing as a form of collective behavior in the patent system).
18. For discussions of the need for principles to guide policy determinations about
patent remedies, see, for example, Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating
Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 725 (2011); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 505 (2010) (providing principles to guide policymakers in assessing the relative merits
of alternative policy proposals); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement:
A Transactional Model (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 431, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1278062.
19. The literature includes an increasing number of proposals for tailoring patent
remedies in ways that take the public interest in supporting innovation into account. See,
e.g., Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
733 (2012); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV.
517 (2014); Samson Vermont, Basing Patent Remedies on Harm to the World Instead of
Harm to the Patentee (May 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). It also
includes proposals for tailoring patent remedies to reflect the relational or transactional
aspects of patents. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and
Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009) (focusing on the relational value of patents
and the importance of employing practical reason as an approach to patent remedies);
Heald, supra note 18, at 1176 (stating that the goal of patent remedies is to provide
incentives for efficient transactions to occur while minimizing cost of transacting).
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competition among alternative modes of innovation without materially undermining the patent system.20
II. AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF INNOVATING
“Gettin’ good players is easy. Gettin’ ‘em to play together is the hard
part.”—Casey Stengel

In a controversial presidential campaign speech, now known as
the “you didn’t build that” speech, President Obama told his audience
that “[i]f you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some
help,” referring to the essential role of shared infrastructure and collective knowledge in supporting individual achievement.21 Since then,
Obama has continued to challenge the image of the rugged individual
inventor and entrepreneur, emphasizing the social context in which
innovation takes place and the importance of cumulative contributions to business success.22 An emphasis on collaboration and cooperation among stakeholders is now evident in both federal and state
innovation policies.23
While the need for collaboration to solve scientific and technological problems is not new,24 what is new is the scale and complexity of
the problems that need to be solved and the large and diverse group
of people who can come together to solve them using decentralized,
20. I am not arguing that patents are always bad for cooperation. Patents may be
useful, even essential, in supporting certain kinds of coordination and cooperation in
innovation. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1751 (2010) [hereinafter Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons]; Paul J. Heald,
A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005); F. Scott Kieff,
Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327 (2006). Moreover, firms
have alternative appropriability strategies that they can use in place of patents, so
weakening patents may not necessarily mean greater access. See, e.g., Jonathan M.
Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691 (2009). I argue only that
patents create systematic disadvantages for certain kinds of cooperative innovation that
provide social benefits such as lower cost innovation, competition with existing proprietary
systems, or the creation of new products and ideas that might otherwise be unavailable.
21. This speech now has its own spot on Wikipedia. See a full discussion of this and
related speeches at You Didn’t Build That, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
You_didn’t_ build_that (last modified Jan. 19, 2014).
22. SEE BARACK OBAMA, U.S. PRESIDENT, REMARKS AT A CAMPAIGN EVENT IN ROANOKE,
VIRGINIA (JULY 13, 2012) (TRANSCRIPT AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.WHITEHOUSE.GOV/THE-PRESSOFFICE/2012/07/13/REMARKS-PRESIDENT-CAMPAIGN-EVENT-ROANOKE-VIRGINIA).
23. See, e.g., Steven C. Currall & Ed Frauenheim, How the U.S. Can Lead on
Technological Innovation, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://seattle
times.com/html/opinion/2023076667_stevencurralledfrauenheimopedinnovationresearchxx
xml.html; Bruce Katz & Judith Rodin, Innovative State and City Government Solutions to
Watch in 2012, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-andeconomy/ 2012/01/innovative-local-government-solutions-watch-2012/951/.
24. See generally Ernan McMullin, Openness and Secrecy in Science: Some Notes on
Early History, 10 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 14 (1985) (examining the history of the
ideal and reality of open science).
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low-cost, web-based technologies. Emerging forms of cooperative
innovation can harness new resources, bring multiple disciplines and
perspectives to bear on previously intractable scientific problems,
and increase competition in key areas of intellectual production.
I argue that innovation policies need to respond to the opportunities
of these cooperative innovation systems. To do so, however, requires
an understanding of how these systems diverge from traditional
market-driven modes of innovation in ways that leave them vulnerable to patents. I therefore explore the mechanisms on which cooperative systems of innovation rely and the potential effects of patents
on these mechanisms. Two examples of cooperative innovation help
to illustrate both the power of these models and their vulnerability
to patents.
A. Distinct Features of Cooperative Innovation
“[W]hat really distinguishes open source is not just source, but an
‘architecture of participation’ . . . .”—Tim O’Reilly

Cooperative innovation is used in this article to refer to open access innovation processes fueled by the voluntary participation of
large numbers of people who share their ideas and discoveries freely
and openly with other members of the innovation community. Entry
is free, or close to free, and the cost to participate is low. Progress is
highly sequential and dependent upon large numbers of small steps
that build upon each other. This kind of innovation diverges from
traditional market-based modes of innovation in its reliance on nonmarket mechanisms for sustaining cooperation.
Cooperation involves working together to advance common goals
or obtain mutual benefits. It can occur among even purely selfish
economically rational actors where individual economic interests
align with the collective interest. Sustaining cooperation when individual economic interests diverge from the interests of the collective
is more challenging. A number of studies have tried to identify the
factors that are needed to sustain cooperation beyond situations in
which rational economic actors have aligned interests.25 Case studies
25. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN (2011); SOCIAL
DILEMMAS: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS (David A. Schroeder ed., 1995)
(giving an overview of different perspectives on decisions made by those in social dilemmas
and the factors that influence choices to act in the interests of the group); Benkler, supra
note 1; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for
Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems, 325 SCI. 419 (2009). For an
organizational approach to understanding how patents influence knowledge communities,
see, for example, Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Learning To Live with Patents: A Dynamic
Model of a Knowledge Community’s Response to Legal Institutional Change (Nov. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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of open source software communities have been particularly helpful
in identifying the mechanisms that support cooperative intellectual
production.26 They have illustrated the importance of trust and reciprocity, and shown how these mechanisms can work when groups
become large and relationships attenuated.
In open source software communities, people cooperate with each
other even when they do not know each other and their interactions
are limited. Team members must decide how much they can trust
each other before joining the team and without the chance to establish personal relationships or forms of mutual control.27 Instead of
personal relationships, the decision to join the team is based on beliefs about the motivation of other team members to adhere to the
mutual norms of the open source software community. Participants
must believe that other members of the community will continue to
act in ways that are consistent with the open source model of free
sharing. This is an example of swift trust, a unique form of trust that
occurs between people or groups who come together in temporary
teams to solve collaborative tasks.28 The maintenance of these communities depends on “their ability to a) develop and enforce rules of
cooperation in a self-organized manner, and to b) develop selfenforcing swift trust which is based on generalized reciprocity between group members.”29 Keeping the cost of participation low is also
essential to the sustainability of these groups.30
A growing body of empirical work in other areas involving selfgoverning systems of cooperative resource management and use supports these findings, emphasizing the importance of trust—
particularly swift trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity in attracting

26. See, e.g., Greg R. Vetter, Commercial Free and Open Source Software: Knowledge
Production, Hybrid Appropriability, and Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087 (2009).
27. See Margit Osterloh & Sandra Rota, Trust and Community in Open Source Software Production, 26 ANALYSE & KRITIK 279 (2004).
28. For early development and use of “swift trust,” see, for example, Debra Meyerson
et al., Swift Trust and Temporary Groups, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 166, 168 (Roderick
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996). For an interesting discussion of swift trust as it
arises in different contexts and the factors affecting its formation, see Michael J. Fahy,
Understanding “Swift Trust” To Improve Interagency Collaboration in New York City
(Sept. 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/17362.
29. Osterloh & Rota, supra note 27, at 280; see also C. Brad Crisp & Sirkaa L. Jarvenpaa, Swift Trust in Global Virtual Teams: Trusting Beliefs and Normative Actions, 12 J.
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 45 (2013) (examining the role and vulnerabilities of swift trust in ad
hoc global virtual teams).
30. Copyright law has provided a limited enforcement mechanism, through the use of
licenses that impose varying commitments on users of open source software to make their
own contributions open and accessible. Even with these licenses in place, however, trust
remains an important part of sustaining open source software systems.
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and sustaining participation.31 This work also suggests that to sustain cooperation, laws need to be applied in ways that support, or at
the very least minimize interference with, the norms, customs, and
organizational structures that support these critical non-market
mechanisms.32 Where members of a group are contributing their time
and ideas freely and voluntarily, their willingness to participate will
be influenced by the behavior of other group members and even, to a
lesser extent, by the behavior of non-group members.33 Their willingness to make contributions will depend on the extent to which other
group members act in accordance with shared group norms and reciprocate with their own contributions and the extent to which the contributions that group members freely provide remain free. Free riding
and private appropriation of the benefits produced in the group by
people outside of the group may also undermine internal motivations
to contribute. Problems may arise for the group where legal rules or
the incentives that these rules create undermine or conflict with the
shared understandings and commitments of the group, leading to deviations from accepted and expected cooperative behavior.
These insights are making their way into at least some areas of
the law. In contract law, for example, relational contract theory provides a view of contracts as relations rather than discrete transactions, with many of the contract terms left implicit and governed by
trust between the parties.34 Recent work on contracts and innovation
illustrates how firms use incomplete contracts to sustain cooperative
relationships in the face of imperfect information.35 In corporate law,
31. See, e.g., TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL
RESEARCH (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2003); UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A
COMMONS (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007); STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF
OPEN SOURCE (2004); Benkler, supra note 1; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust,
Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Osterloh & Rota, supra note 27; Margit Osterloh, Sandra Rota & Bernhard Kuster, Trust and Commerce in Open Source—A Contradiction? (Nov. 22, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.research
gate.net/publication/226907215_Trust_and_Commerce_in_Open_Source_A_Contradiction.
32. See, e.g., TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL
RESEARCH, supra note 31; UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Osterloh, Rota & Kuster, supra note 31, at 9.
34. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009). Contracts
allow parties to structure their relationships with each other in ways that foster trust and
facilitate relationship-specific investments where the payoffs from the relationship cannot
be predicted and contracted for in advance. In some cases the terms governing the division
of payoffs from a shared innovation project are left open, the parties relying instead on the
braiding of formal terms for sharing information about the progress and prospects of their
joint activities with informal terms governing subsequent outcomes of the joint work. This
information-sharing regime “braids” together the formal and informal elements of the
contract in a way that endogenizes the growth of trust between the participants. See
Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in
Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010).
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behavioral theories based on trust and trustworthiness challenge
conventional views of the firm.36 This work cautions against excessive
reliance on external sanctions that may undermine internal trust.37
As new forms of collective production emerge, there have even been
suggestions for creating an entirely new field of law, cooperation law,
to reflect arrangements between people that are based on a variety of
modes of sharing, cooperation, and collaboration—such as co-housing,
barter, and community-financed businesses.38 These legal responses
aim to modify existing formal rules where needed to support and protect beneficial informal rules and understandings. I suggest that internalizing the negative effects that patents may have on non-market
mechanisms of trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity in cooperative
systems will begin to pull similar considerations into patent law in
contexts, such as those described below, where they are most important.39 The following two examples illustrate both the power of
cooperative innovation and the vulnerabilities of such systems to the
incentives and associated transaction costs that patents create.
B. Two Examples
1. Crowd Science: The Example of Foldit
The power of crowd science, the use of many volunteers working
together to solve complex data intensive problems, has been illustrated in areas as diverse as finding planets, deciphering ancient
texts, and building climate models.40 Crowd science is increasingly
informing what we know about diverse natural phenomena such as
bird populations and their distributions,41 the pollination habits of

36. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1735 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Trust] (arguing that the behavioral phenomena of
internalized trust and trustworthiness play important roles in encouraging cooperation
within firms); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442 (Claire A. Hill & Brett
H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
37. See Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., Janelle Orsi, Cooperation Law for a Sharing Economy, YES! MAG. (Sept. 23,
2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/cooperation-law-for-a-sharing-economy (“A
new sharing economy is emerging—but how does it fit within our legal system? Time for a
whole new field of cooperation law.”).
39. For a discussion of how IP operates at the boundaries between groups, see, for
example, Strandburg, supra note 14.
40. GAMING FOR THE GREATER GOOD, http://gamingforthegreatergood.com (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014).
41. The Audubon Society’s Christmas Bird Count began in 1900. A transformed
version, eBird, was launched in 2002 by Cornell Lab of Ornithology in collaboration with
the National Audubon Society. About eBird, EBIRD, http://ebird.org/content/ebird/about/
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bees,42 and the surface of the moon,43 and is also helping to solve puzzles in quantum physics,44 the anthropology of microbes,45 and the
early development stages of dinosaurs.46 These divergent crowd science projects share a common foundation built upon open access,
sharing, and cooperation between many heterogeneous participants
with diverse motivations that may not be consistent with a pricebased system. They illustrate the opportunities that cooperation outside of the marketplace offer for scaling up the collection and analysis
of large amounts of data and for building knowledge through the accumulation of many incremental contributions of information and ideas.47 Unfortunately they also share common vulnerabilities to a patent
system that is not designed with them in mind. The story of Foldit, a
particularly promising citizen science project, highlights both the risks
and opportunities of these kinds of cooperative innovation.48
This story starts with the creation of a video game called Foldit
that anybody can play.49 Within ten days of their start on December
16, 2010, players of this new online protein folding game were able to
solve the protein structure of a retrovirus similar to HIV, a structure
that had eluded scientists for over ten years.50 The results provided
scientists with important insights into the treatment of AIDS and
were published in a scientific journal with the video game team players as co-authors.51 This is only one of a number of scientific advances
made by Foldit players. Other contributions by Foldit players include
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). eBird collects bird abundance and distribution data and enlists
public participation in analyzing the over eighty million observations. See id.
42. The Great Sunflower Project was started by a single academic researcher
interested in examining the pollination activities of bees, and it now has 90,000 registered
volunteers planting sunflowers and taking observation samples. See GREAT SUNFLOWER
PROJECT, http://www.greatsunflower.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
43. See, e.g., Moon Zoo, ZOONIVERSE, https://www.zooniverse.org/project/moonzoo (last
visited Mar. 22, 2014).
44. See, e.g., The Story Behind “Quantum Moves,” SCI. HOME, http://www.science
athome.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (describing Quantum Moves, a game that uses
community efforts to help build a quantum computer).
45. See American Gut, supra note 5.
46. See OPEN DINOSAUR PROJECT, http://opendino.wordpress.com/ (last modified
May 17, 2013).
47. See, e.g., Clay Shirky, How the Internet Will (One Day) Transform Government,
Address at TED Conference (June 2012), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_
shirky_how_the_internet_will_one_day_transform_government.
48. See, e.g., Eric Hand, People Power, 466 NATURE 685 (2010) (discussing projects
involving the concept of distributed thinking, featuring Foldit); Collins Kilgore, Gaming for the
Greater Good, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.jetlaw.org/?p=8381.
49. See FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
50. See Firas Khatib et al., Crystal Structure of a Monomeric Retroviral Protease
Solved by Protein Folding Game Players, 18 NATURE STRUCTURAL & MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY 1175, 1177 (2011).
51. Id.
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the discovery of a unique enzyme “backbone” configuration for the
development of novel enzymes, a discovery described by scientists as
the most detailed remodeling of a protein structure by humans working through a computer-based process.52 This work moves beyond
protein folding, which is critical for understanding how the human
body works, and into the realm of protein design, which holds promise for advancing drug discovery. The protein design results were
published in Nature Biotechnology, a prestigious scientific journal,
with Foldit Players again included in the author list.53
Foldit was developed by David Baker, a protein research scientist
at the University of Washington, together with Zoran Povic and Seth
Cooper, computer scientists at the same university. The program is
supported through a collaboration between the Biochemistry Department and the Center for Game Science at the University of
Washington.54 The vision behind Foldit is one of enabling public participation in large-scale distributed science. The project “aims to predict, design, and understand biochemical structures, and study how
humans and computers can best work together to further these aims”
through a growing community of game-developed expert volunteers.55
Anybody can play the game simply by visiting the Foldit website,
consenting to user-friendly terms of use that focus primarily on explaining how information is collected and shared, and downloading
the free software needed to play the game.56
Participants in the game, most of who have little or no background
in biochemistry, are introduced to some basic concepts of protein folding and then engaged in solving “puzzles” designed around specific
protein structure problems that have been identified but not solved
by scientists. The players collaborate with teammates while competing against other players to obtain the highest-scoring (lowestenergy) models. The scoring system includes different categories
based on levels and types of contributions. The website identifies the

52. See Christopher B. Eiben et al., Increased Diels-Alderase Activity Through Backbone Remodeling Guided by Foldit Players, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 190, 192 (2012);
see also David Baker, More Amazing FoldIt Results and New Flu Virus Challenges, FOLDIT
(May 27, 2011, 6:41 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/989769; Zoran, Recent Exciting Discoveries by Foldit, FOLDIT (Apr. 19, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/989576.
53. See Eiben et al., supra note 52 (showing that Foldit Players are included on the
publication list; reporting the use of game-driven crowdsourcing to enhance the activity of
a computationally designed enzyme through the functional remodeling of its structure).
54. See CENTER GAME SCI., http://centerforgamescience.com/site/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014).
55. See Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/legal (last
updated Mar. 8, 2013).
56. New players begin by loading the game and watching tutorials that explain the
game and the scientific concepts needed to understand it. See How To Download and Start
Playing Foldit!, FOLDIT (Nov. 9, 2010, 11:47 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/988864.
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top players in each category and for each puzzle. It also provides
rankings based on global scores and a hall of fame for the very top
scorers. The game has separate rankings for soloists, who work on
their projects alone, and evolvers, who work on and improve solutions
that have been shared with other people. A high ranking is valued
and sought after by the active players, and many of them carefully
watch the scores and study the ways in which the rankings are calculated. Players are quick to point out areas where they believe the
scoring is not accurately reflecting good performance or otherwise
seems unfair.57
Three years into the life of the Foldit games, there is clear evidence that this massively multiplayer online game, which enlists
players worldwide to solve challenging protein-structure prediction
problems, offers improvements over the computational models currently being used by scientists.58 “Obsessive gamers’ hours at the
computer have now topped scientists’ efforts to improve a model enzyme, in what researchers say is the first crowd sourced redesign of a
protein.”59 The use of games offers valuable ways for engaging citizen
scientists, drawing on the vast amounts of free time that people are
willing to devote to problem solving just because they want to. “[T]he
average young person today in a country with a strong gamer culture
will have spent 10,000 hours playing online games by the age of
twenty-one. . . . [C]ollectively all the World of Warcraft gamers have
spent 5.93 million years solving the virtual problems of [that particular game world].”60 Foldit harnesses this energy to solve difficult and
data-intensive problems, serving as the flagship game for the concept
of using crowds to solve complex scientific problems.61
This system of intellectual production relies upon non-market
mechanisms of trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity. While the
game is structured as a competition to get the highest score, competi-

57. See, e.g., Bruno Kestemont, Actual Competitors for the Global Score, FOLDIT (Oct.
25, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://fold.it/portal/node/996160.
58. See Seth Cooper et al., Predicting Protein Structures with a Multiplayer Online
Game, 466 NATURE 756, 756 (2010).
59. Jessica Marshall, Victory for Crowdsourced Biomolecule Design: Players of the
Online Game Foldit Guide Researchers to a Better Enzyme, NATURE (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://www.nature.com/news/victory-for-crowdsourced-biomolecule-design-1.9872.
60. See Jane McGonigal, Gaming Can Make a Better World, Address at TED Conference
(Feb. 2010) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/jane_mcgonigal_gaming_
can_make_a_better_world.
61. See, e.g., John Walker, The Inaugural Horace Awards for Forgotten IGF Entrants,
ROCK, PAPER, SHOTGUN (Jan. 8, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.rockpapershotgun.com/2013/
01/08/the-inaugural-horace-awards-for-forgotten-igf-entrants/ (discussing the Foldit game in
the wake of results on the winners of the Fifteenth Annual Independent Games Festival,
which is well known in the video game industry, and suggesting it should be recognized with
the Horace Award for Actually Advancing Science).
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tion among the players is moderated by the fact that there are no
monetary consequences attached to having a winning score. Moreover, the results of gameplay are portrayed as contributions to the
public domain of scientific knowledge. The Foldit site explains that
diversity advances this knowledge, so even those with lower scores
feel they are doing something important. The low-level incentives to
win are combined with norms of sharing and open communication to
foster a collaborative environment.62 Members are encouraged to
communicate, share ideas, and troubleshoot through the Foldit blog,
forum, wiki, or through sharing “recipes” useful in solving various
puzzles. The importance of sharing as a fundamental value for the
community is highlighted in the Foldit Terms of Service, which remind members that: “We are sharing what we learn with others from
all over the world. That is how science is done. We have to share so
others can learn, too.”63 Reciprocity in the exchange of ideas is also
encouraged. It is encouraged through member interests in sustaining
a robust forum for troubleshooting and a library of shared recipes to
advance gameplay. There is also a built-in reciprocal exchange between the players and Foldit. With the consent of the players, the
Foldit project continuously gathers and analyzes gameplay data such
as biochemical structures, algorithms, and tool and algorithm usage
that may have research benefits, and in return the project agrees to
give attribution to the players who make discoveries and to make
these discoveries publicly available.
Out of this collective effort has come publishable results and novel
discoveries.64 While scientific publications co-authored by video game
players may seem unusual, this could become the norm in at least
some areas of science if crowd science continues to progress at its
current rate. The Foldit community is large and growing. In January
2012, the game had 240,000 registered players and approximately
2200 active players.65 In January 2014 the game appears to have almost doubled this number of registered players and more than doubled the number of active players.66 The game continues to expand
not just its number of players, but also the reach of its problemsolving power. Most recently, the creators of the game have turned
their eyes to the design of new therapeutic enzymes and even small

62. Foldit community rules can be found online at Community Rules, FOLDIT,
http://fold.it/portal/communityrules (last updated Apr. 18, 2013).
63. Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, supra note 55.
64. See, e.g., Khatib et al., supra note 49, at 1175 (listing authors as including the
“Foldit Contenders Group” and the “Foldit Void Crushers Group”).
65. Marshall, supra note 59 (noting that active players are players who have logged in
and been active on the web site within the last week as measured on a particular day).
66. See Top Evolvers, FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/players (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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molecule design, taking the crowdsourcing approach into the realm of
drug development.67
As puzzles move into areas with more direct commercial potential,
however, tensions between the non-market mechanisms on which
Foldit relies and proprietary interests enabled by patenting are likely
to emerge. Analogies can be drawn to the tensions that have emerged
in many areas of academic science as the distinction between research and commercial application has blurred.68 During its first few
years the Foldit website provided little information on intellectual
property ownership, not seeing it as something that was needed. In
response to queries by its participants, the site administrators/founders stated that the “Foldit project was initiated with the
goal of democratizing science, and we stand behind that. [T]he process of discovery and the eventual results of game play will all be
open domain.”69 In line with the original game philosophy of democratic science, the founders of the game then asked the game participants for their views on intellectual property ownership. Developer
chat discussions in 2012 were used to flesh out what a Foldit intellectual property ownership policy should look like.70
The community discussions about intellectual property ownership
raised a number of important issues about how patents might impact
Foldit. Some Foldit members focused on negative effects that patenting of results might have on the intrinsic motivations and norms of
sharing that motivate the game. They expressed the view that Foldit
is a public, volunteer-driven process, and therefore all ideas and contributions should remain public.71 Others focused more on the challenges of benefit-sharing in a system that works best when it is collaborative and invites cumulative refinements of ideas by competing
members of the game. Many of the contributions take the form of
computer recipes for improving game play, contributions which may

67. Rebecca Hersher, FoldIt Game’s Next Play: Crowdsourcing Better Drug Design,
SPOONFUL OF MEDICINE, NATURE MED. (Apr. 13, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://blogs.nature.com/
spoonful/2012/04/foldit-games-next-play-crowdsourcing-better-drug-design.html?WT.mc_id=
TWT_NatureBlogs.
68. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of
Scientific Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145
(Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1996). I have explored the
challenges that patents create in biomedical research at greater length. Liza Vertinsky,
Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949.
69. Zoran, Comment to Set My Mind at Ease, FOLDIT (Mar. 22, 2009, 3:31 AM),
http://fold.it/portal/node/267249.
70. See Developer Chat, FOLDIT (June 1, 2012), http://fold.it/portal/node/992849.
71. See, e.g., GlaciusCool, Comment to Foldit Ownership Policy, FOLDIT (May 31, 2012,
1:25 AM), http://fold.it/portal/node/992792 (“That which is created by the public should remain
in the hands of the public for the benefit of all human kind. Scientific discovery—even if it’s
just a molecular recipe—should be used by and available to all who seek the knowledge.”).
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not themselves be patentable or serve as patent-invalidating prior art
but which could lead to the discovery of something that is. Participants might not be willing to share their recipes freely if they
thought that someone else could use them to make and appropriate
results for private commercial gain. Other issues raised by Foldit
members focused on the practical challenges, transaction costs, and
administrative headaches that patents might create. Participants
worried about what formula would be used to allocate rights in a way
that fairly rewarded performance, and whether it would be possible
to discern who the co-inventors of an invention are in the context of
cumulative contributions. The possibility that some contributions
might come from employees with preexisting obligations to their
companies created a further layer of complexity and concern.
Ultimately, the Foldit administrators proposed the following ownership provision, guided no doubt by the University of Washington
Center for Commercialization:
Scientific discoveries will be made publicly available and the University of Washington will handle ownership of discoveries. All
significant scientific discoveries (such as structures, algorithms,
etc) made in game will be made publicly available. In the event
that some discoveries may warrant patent protection, University of
Washington will handle the patent application process. US patent
law will govern IP attribution for each discovery. Individual players who contributed to the discovery will be considered coinventors for any discovery produced through play.72

A few things are notable about this policy. First, the University of
Washington plays a direct role in managing patent choices. The University of Washington has an active technology transfer center, the
Center for Commercialization, and its intellectual property policies
and licensing practices reflect traditional assumptions about patenting and technology transfer. The University’s intellectual property
policies are “intended to show the University’s positive attitude toward transfer of results of its research to the private sector” and are
based on the assumption that “it is generally in the best interests of
the University and the public that patents be obtained and/or licenses granted.”73 This approach conflicts with one focused on the free
and open sharing and use of ideas.

72. Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, supra note 55; see also Seth Cooper, Comment to
Foldit Ownership Policy, FOLDIT (June 4, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/992792
(announcing a draft ownership policy).
73. PRESIDENT OF THE UNIV. OF WASH., EXEC. ORD. NO. 37: PATENT, INVENTION, AND
COPYRIGHT POLICY (last updated Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.washington.edu/
admin/rules/policies/PO/EO36.html.
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Second, while the implication is that inventors will be the owners
of their inventions, the policy is not clear about what rights the University will have, what rights the inventors will have, and what restrictions will be imposed on participant inventors who end up with
ownership rights over a patented invention. The policy indicates only
that the University will handle ownership and that significant scientific discoveries will be made publicly available. Perhaps in response
to concerns about the sustainability of a public domain approach, the
Foldit developers, who are University of Washington employees, have
announced to the Foldit community that they have committed to assign all proceeds from any patents on inventions that they discover
back to the development of the Foldit community.
Third, although the policy provides that “[i]ndividual players who
contributed to the discovery will be considered co-inventors for any
discovery produced through play,”74 joint inventorship is determined
solely by patent law.75 In some cases, individuals might think that
they are co-inventors when they are not, since the statutory definition of joint inventorship is narrower than the policy suggests.76
Finally, the Foldit Terms of Service can be changed at any time,
leaving the University to reconsider its stance on ownership should
the Foldit game start to yield results that are commercially lucrative.
While the concerns of the Foldit members have yet to be realized,
the potential of the game to aid in areas of commercial interest, such
as drug discovery, will inevitably increase tensions between the system of volunteer contributions and sharing on the one hand and patenting and revenue sharing on the other hand.77 One of the remark74. Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, supra note 55.
75. Joint inventorship is legally determined under patent law based on involvement
by each inventor in the original conception of the invention. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome
Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The contributor must have in
mind and be contributing to the idea of the complete and operative invention, which would
require knowledge of the entire invention and not just an understanding that some kind of
discovery is likely to result. Reducing the invention to practice, while a valuable
contribution, is not an inventorship contribution. Id. at 1228. While each joint inventor
must contribute to the conception of the invention, it is enough to contribute to one claim.
35 U.S.C. § 116 (2012). While there must be some element of joint behavior involved, a
loose collaboration, “working under common direction,” or even “one inventor seeing a
relevant report and building upon it,” may be enough. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter &
Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 916-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If joint inventorship has
occurred, the U.S. patent application must name all of the inventors. In the absence of any
agreement to the contrary, the joint inventors are joint owners of the patent and can
independently exploit the benefits of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2012).
76. For an interesting discussion of some of the problems caused by this disconnect
between common understandings and legal definitions of joint inventorship, see Aaron
Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. &
ENT. L. 73, 77-78 (2012).
77. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 68 (noting the tensions that patents create in
academic science).
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able features of the Foldit community is the willingness of game
players to share the recipes that they develop to solve protein structure puzzles.78 This sharing helps to sustain the evolvers, who copy
and build on the game strategies used by others, and also aids the
general population of game players. These recipes function like research tools, serving as critical inputs into the processes that lead to
discoveries about protein folding without describing such discoveries
or being independently patentable.
The ability to patent a discovery that may have commercial value
will make participants less willing to share their game strategies for
a number of reasons. First, participants will be less willing to reveal
game strategies, including the software code that enables these
strategies, if there is a chance that a third party will take this information and use it to make proprietary discoveries that are not in
turn shared with the group. The nature of the information that is
shared in the exchange of recipes is unlikely to give these participants any claim as a joint inventor and is unlikely to constitute prior
art, leaving them with little ability to either block the patent or share
in its control.
Second, patenting will shift attention from the intrinsic motivation of obtaining a high score to the extrinsic motivation of obtaining
commercially valuable intellectual property. Those who have contributed significant ideas that are not patentable may have to sit by
and watch as their contributions lead to commercially lucrative patentable inventions that benefit others. The rules around coauthorship and the ability to be expansive in attributing coauthorship at low cost make joint authorship a useful way of respecting group contributions. The approach does not translate well into
situations of joint inventorship, since contributions will typically take
the form of tools that make discovery more likely rather than contributions to the conception of the invention.79 Members may even have
incentives to drop out of the game and seek patent protection for discoveries that they would not have made but for access to the ideas
contributed by other players.

78. As one high-scoring player of Foldit explained during an interview, “I shared BF
[blue fuse tool] fully because Foldit is so much more than a game—the competition is serious and fierce, but we are also trying to improve the understanding of huge biological proteins. We collaborate and compete at the same time.” Researchers Uncover Foldit Gamers’
Strategies, DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.dddmag.com/
news/2011/11/researchers-uncover-foldit-gamers’-strategies.
79. In the scientific world, journal articles often include a variety of contributors,
including those who have performed experiments or contributed hard work to generate the
results. In contrast, joint inventorship is legally determined under patent law based on
involvement by each inventor in the original conception of the invention. For further discussion
of joint inventorship, see supra notes 75-76.
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Third, if and when Foldit moves into areas where it competes with
commercial players, particularly if it partners with pharmaceutical
companies or other private companies, there will be stronger pressures on the administrators of the Foldit game to limit the public use
of the discoveries generated. Where discoveries have identifiable
commercial applications, the financial incentives to limit information
sharing and to restrict use of the discoveries will be larger. In addition, if commercial partners play a bigger role in the game, the very
different norms and rules governing commercial drug development
will influence the ways in which the game is organized and the results are shared.
While these harms remain primarily prospective for now, the risks
that market-based incentives may crowd out non-market mechanisms of cooperation have been well documented in other similar areas and should not be ignored.80 Crowding out occurs when one approach to incentivizing participation has a negative impact on another.81 It can occur in a variety of different ways, including internal
displacement of intrinsic motivations and disruptions of the system
through the actions and pressures of participants from outside of the
system.82 In projects like Foldit, the social value of contributing to the
project and the enjoyment derived from playing games in an open
science context, as well as the commitment of Foldit administrators
to open science, may eventually be overshadowed by financial incen-

80. As described by Yochai Benkler, “[w]e have now . . . almost two decades of literature in experimental economics, game theory, anthropology, political science field studies,
that shows that cooperation in fact does happen much more often than the standard economics textbooks predict, and that under certain structural conditions non-price-based
production is extraordinarily robust. The same literature also suggests that there is crowding-out, or displacement, between monetary and non-monetary motivations as well as between different institutional systems: [sic] social, as opposed to market, as opposed to
state.” Yochai Benkler, Comment to Calacanis’s Wallet and the Web 2.0 Dream, ROUGH
TYPE (July 28, 2006, 11:22 AM), http://www.roughtype.com/?p=466; see also Yochai
Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002)
[hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin].
81. “Crowding out, or the non-separability of social preferences from the introduction
of explicit extrinsic motivation, poses a systemic challenge to using traditional, incentivesbased mechanisms, both private and public, for eliciting desirable behavior.” Benkler,
supra note 1, at 307; see also Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens
May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCI.
1605 (2008). One of the most widely debated examples of crowding out is the use of
payments to encourage blood donations, which pits an economic framework for blood
donations against a system of altruistic unpaid donors. See, e.g., RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE
GIFT RELATIONSHIP 158-59 (1971); Alena M. Buyx, Blood Donation, Payment, and NonCash Incentives: Classical Questions Drawing Renewed Interest, 36 TRANSFUSION MED. &
HEMOTHERAPY 329, 329-30 (2009) (exploring strategies for creating well-designed non-cash
incentives which cut across the rigid dichotomy of altruistic donation versus payment).
82. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 25; SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT BY MOTIVATION:
BALANCING INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES (Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh
eds., 2002).

1086

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1067

tives, such as patent royalties. The financial incentives might thus
crowd out social motivations. This kind of displacement poses an undeniable risk for open source, volunteer-driven models of innovation
like Foldit.83 Sustaining the kinds of non-market mechanisms that
support Foldit, including the important mechanisms of trust, benefitsharing, and reciprocity, will undoubtedly become harder in the presence of patents.84 Ironically, the more successful the non-market
mechanisms are in generating inventions, the more likely it is that
they will come under challenge.
2. Open Source Software: The Example of Linux
“No one ‘owns’ the software in the traditional sense . . . . The result
has been the emergence of a vibrant, innovative and productive collaboration, whose participants are not organized in firms and do
not choose their projects in response to price signals.”—Yochai
Benkler 85

The second example is drawn from open source software.86 Open
source software projects have proven to be a significant economic and
social phenomenon, particularly in the context of software development.87 Sourceforge, which is one of the main internet sites hosting
open source software projects, lists more than 4.8 million daily downloads, more than 430,000 open source software projects involving
more than 3.7 million developers. Its directory connects more than
41.8 million consumers with these open source projects.88 While most
of these projects are small, some, such as the Linux operating system, the Apache web server software, the MySQL database, and the
Firefox web browser, are massive and compete with established proprietary software products. The open source smartphone operating

83. For discussions of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivations and the crowding-out effects
of carrot and stick approaches, see DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT
WHAT MOTIVATES US 3-4, 8-9, 17-21 (2009).
84. As noted earlier, there are many reasons why people become involved in projects like
Foldit, and the three mechanisms described here are meant simply to capture the ways in
which these cooperative systems sustain the involvement of these diverse participants with
their diverse motivations and interests.
85. Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 80.
86. Much has been written about the free and open source software movement. For a
good overview from an intellectual property perspective, see Vetter, supra note 26.
87. See, e.g., Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the “Private-Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. SCI. 209, 209
(2003) (discussing history of open source software and its emergence as major cultural and
economic phenomenon); see also ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR:
MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999).
88. SOURCEFORGE, http://sourceforge.net/about (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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system Android, for example, which is closely tied to Linux, was estimated to have seventy percent of the smartphone market in 2012.89
Open source software projects deviate from private proprietary
models of software development in at least two important ways.90
First, most truly open source software projects are fueled at least in
part by software developers who are primarily intrinsically rather
than extrinsically motivated to participate. People contribute to the
project because they want to, whether to solve their own problems,
contribute to a community that they have benefited from in the past,
gain a reputation, or as an outlet for creativity.91 Second, participants
freely reveal the software that they have developed in ways that allow other participants not only to use it, but also to modify and build
upon it.92 These characteristics are combined with organizational innovations that allow people to contribute to the software project in a
massively distributed, decentralized way, and with very low transaction costs. These open source software systems show how valuable
products can be developed in systems that are based upon the free
contribution and sharing of ideas.93
While a few open source software systems, such as Linux and its
stepchild Android, have been able to compete with proprietary products, the costs of doing so in the presence of an increasing number of
software patents have been large. These costs include millions of dollars spent by Linux and Android users in obtaining patents solely for
defensive purposes, the development and refinement of defensive patent pooling and licensing organizations and strategies, time spent
trying to invalidate patents that might impede use of Linux, and
foreclosure of potentially valuable development paths for Linux
89. See, e.g., Nirav Patel, Apple’s iPhone Is Losing Market Share as Android Gets
70% of the Smartphone Market, GADGET MASTERS (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.thegadget
masters.com/2013/01/28/apple-iphone-is-losing-market-share-as-android-gets-70-of-the-sma
rtphone-market/.
90. For an overview of open source software and its implications and intersections
with intellectual property, see, for example, Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 15.
91. See, e.g., Jürgen Bitzer et al., Intrinsic Motivation in Open Source Software Development, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 162 (2007); Georg von Krogh et al., Carrots and Rainbows:
Motivation and Social Practice in Open Source Software Development, 36 MIS Q. 649, 652
(2012); Chorng-Guang Wu et al., An Empirical Analysis of Open Source Software Developers’ Motivations and Continuance Intentions, 44 INFO. & MGMT. 253, 254-55 (2007). But see,
e.g., Sharon Belenzon & Mark Schankerman, Motivation and Sorting in Open Source Software Innovation (Nov. 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://faculty.
fuqua.duke.edu/~sb135/bio/Belenzon%20Schankerman%20OSS%20July%202012.pdf (examining observed pattern of contributions to open source software projects to extract revealed preferences of developers and illustrating the importance of understanding incentives heterogeneity in open source contributions).
92. See von Hippel & von Krogh, supra note 87 (describing open source software
development systems, referring to them as illustrations of a private-collective model of
innovation that occupies the middle ground between private investment and collective action).
93. Id.
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where such paths fall outside of the protective boundaries established
by large corporate users of open source.94 Moreover, other promising
open source systems switch course or even shut down when confronted with real or imagined patent threats.95 I focus on the story of
Linux and the patent shadows created by Microsoft’s patents for two
reasons. First, this story illustrates the susceptibility of even the
most successful open source models to patent threats. Second, it
demonstrates the difficulties that open source software supporters
face in reducing patent threats.96
Linux was one of the pioneering free and open source software
projects. It has its roots in the intertwined ideologies and development models generated by early free software and open source software movements, which are collectively referred to as Free and Open
Source Software (FOSS).97 At a general level, FOSS is software which
is made freely available, in both object and source code form, for anyone to use, copy, modify, and distribute, thus enabling people to voluntarily improve the design of the software.98 On a closer look, however, FOSS refers both to an ideology about the freedom to use, modify, and share this resource, which lies at the core of the Free Software Movement, and to a methodology for peer-to-peer development,
which is the focus of the Open Source Movement.99
94. For a discussion of some of these costs, see, for example, Deborah Nicholson, Open
Invention Network: A Defensive Patent Pool for Open Source Projects and Businesses, 2012
TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 12. For a discussion of recent efforts by Microsoft to raise the
costs for a number of Android manufacturers through threats of patent infringement suits and
licensing deals with large royalties and very restrictive licensing terms, see, for example,
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012035.pdf (discussing impact of patents in Android context); Tom Warren, Barnes & Noble
“Exposes” Microsoft’s Android Patent Fees and Strategy, WINRUMORS (Nov. 14, 2011, 6:53 PM),
http://www.winrumors.com/barnes-noble-exposes-microsofts-android-patent-fees-and-strategy/.
95. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 94, at 14 (discussing chilling effect of potential
patent threats on small companies and smaller projects even when no actual patent is
asserted); Wen Wen et al., Patent Commons, Thickets, and Open Source Software Entry by
Start-Up Firms, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19394, 2013), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19394 (empirical study showing that rate of entry of start-up
software firms increases with the size of open source software communities).
96. For an example of the power of open source software models as a substitute for
traditional standard-setting approaches, see Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and
Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225 (2007).
97. See, e.g., Vetter, supra note 26; see also WOLFGANG LEISTER ET AL., OPEN SOURCE,
OPEN COLLABORATION AND INNOVATION 15-26, 47-78 (Wolfgang Leister & Nils
Christophersen eds., 2012).
98. See, e.g., The Open Source Definition, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE,
http://opensource.org/osd (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); What Is Free Software and Why Is It
So Important for Society?, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.fsf.org/about/what-is-freesoftware (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
99. For a related discussion of the causal factors underlying FOSS, see Greg R. Vetter,
Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software Licensing: Moderating the Rein over Software
Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183 (2006). For the Free Software Movement’s description of how they
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While these two camps share many features, they have different
views about what FOSS requires—disparities that quickly become
apparent in their responses to proprietary uses of software.100 The
Free Software Movement believes that software should be free. To
promote this goal and to protect the free use of software, it advocates
that uses of and improvements to open source software should be
made available on open source terms. Beliefs about freedom, fairness,
and reciprocity lie at the center of the free software movement. The
Open Source Software movement is less worried about proprietary
software and proprietary use of FOSS, viewing open source more as a
development methodology and less as a social movement.101 Both
groups share a reliance on swift trust and reciprocity, however, and
beliefs about the value of open source software help to sustain norms
of open access and sharing that are critical to open source software.102
The entanglement of ideology and development methodology is important in explaining both the strengths and the vulnerabilities of
even large and successful open source projects like Linux.103
Linux was developed pursuant to a unique collaborative development project,104 and it remains one of the largest systems of collaborative development in the history of computing. As described by Eric
Raymond in his seminal article The Cathedral and the Bazaar, “Who
would have thought even five years ago (1991) that a world-class operating system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking
by several thousand developers scattered all over the planet, connected only by the tenuous strands of the Internet?”105 It encapsudiffer from the Open Source Movement, see Why “Free Software” Is Better Than Open Source,
GNU OPERATING SYS., https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2014) (noting that the movements “disagree on the basic principles, but agree
more or less on the practical recommendations”).
100. See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Free Software as a Social Movement, ZNET (Dec. 18, 2005),
http://www.zcommunications.org/free-software-as-a-social-movement-by-richard-stallman.
101. See, e.g., Anne Barron, Free Software Production as Critical Social Practice, 42
ECON. & SOC’Y 597 (2013) (describing the contrast between the ideological approach of the
free software movement and the pragmatic approach of the subsequent open source
software movement).
102. See, e.g., Osterloh & Rota, supra note 27; Osterloh, Rota & Kuster, supra note 31,
at 2 (“The fragile balance between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated developers may
be disturbed by the entrance of extrinsically motivated commercial firms into the world of
open source.”).
103. See, e.g., Vetter, supra note 99 (exploring important aspects of this entanglement
between ideology and methodology).
104. See, e.g., LINUX FOUNDATION, http://www.linuxfoundation.org (last visited Mar. 22,
2014) (describing how Linux is built).
105. See Eric Steven Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, http://www.catb.org/~esr/
writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/index.html (last updated Aug. 2, 2002)
(contrasting two forms of software development, the hierarchical cathedral approach used in
proprietary software and the decentralized, open, Internet-based development style used
by Linux).

1090

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1067

lates the powerful idea of software as a modular and communal Internet-based effort.106 The source code of Linux is made available
without charge, and with the ability to freely modify and use this
code, pursuant to version two of a well-known free and open source
copyright license called the General Public License (GPL).107 The licensing model is a legal innovation, what has been referred to as legal jujitsu, designed to use intellectual property rights to preserve
the open source nature of the project.108 The GPL embodies principles
of open access, free sharing, and reciprocity in its license restrictions
and contractual obligations as a way of preserving and expanding the
domain of open source software. While open source licensing strategies
such as this one have helped to sustain open source efforts, the need for
additional strategies to preserve open source has been widely acknowledged by proponents of open source.109 In the case of Linux, backing by
large corporate players was an essential part of its survival.
Linux rapidly gained popularity as an alternative to Microsoft’s
proprietary software operating system. In response, Microsoft began
a concerted strategy to disadvantage Linux by encouraging companies to trade open source participation for financial gain and by getting the users of Linux to pay royalties to Microsoft. This included a
controversial joint patent agreement between Microsoft and a company called Novell, Inc., a software company that had initially set
itself up to compete with Microsoft using Linux-based open source

106. See, e.g., LEISTER ET AL., supra note 97, at 47-78.
107. The GPL provides that software licensed under the GPL can be freely used, copied
and modified, provided that any modifications and improvements to this software are also
made available to the public in source code form under the same license terms. The first
two versions of the GPL focused primarily on copyright, but a third version has been
developed to address the significant challenges that software patents create for the open
source process. See GNU General Public License, Version 2, GNU OPERATING SYS. (June,
1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html; GNU General Public License, Version 3,
GNU OPERATING SYS. (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html; see also
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, A First Look at General Public License 3.0, 24 COMPUTER &
INTERNET L. 15, 15 (2007). For critiques of GPL version 3 see, for example, James E.J.
Bottomley et al., Kernel Developers’ Position on GPLv3: The Dangers and Problems with
GPLv3, LWN.NET (Sept. 15, 2006), http://lwn.net/Articles/200422/; John Carroll, The Crux
of the GPL Problem, ZDNET (June 4, 2007, 7:42 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/
carroll/the-crux-of-the-gpl-problem/1707.
108. The GNU/Linux computer operating system includes the Linux kernel, an open
source project initiated by Linus Torvalds in 1991, and GNU software emerging from the free
software movement founded by Richard Stallman in 1985. Richard Stallman, Linux and the
GNU System, GNU OPERATING SYS., http://www.gnu.org/gnu/linux-and-gnu.html (last updated
Apr. 12, 2014). I focus here on the development of the Linux kernel, although the issues extend
to the broader GNU/Linux operating system.
109. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753
(2013); Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive
Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012); Greg R. Vetter, A Public Domain Approach to
Free and Open Source Software?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE (forthcoming 2014).
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software products.110 Novell received large payments pursuant to its
deal with Microsoft, and when the deal ended, a technology consortium led by Microsoft acquired key intellectual property assets from
Novell for $450 million.111 Members of the FOSS community criticized
Novell for what they saw as a defection from group norms and a compromise of the interests of the free software community. Novell was
seen as free-riding on the value created by the open source community and capitalizing on the holdup value of patents covering inventions
used by the open source community. More importantly, the deal was
seen as providing unwarranted legitimacy for patent claims made
against Linux, creating a cloud of uncertainty and fear for users of
Linux and deterring open source developers.112
Shortly after the first agreement with Novell was signed, Microsoft began making public claims that Linux violated more than
200 of Microsoft’s patents—no fewer than 235 according to Microsoft’s general counsel at that time.113 The fact that the Linux
source code is freely available allows patent holders to scrutinize the
code for areas that might implicate their patents. The fact that the
system involves combining and building on incremental contributions
means that patents covering even small parts of the system may
have tremendous holdup power. Since its initial claims of infringement, Microsoft has focused on systematically securing patent licensing deals from Linux users, although it has also relied on patent infringement litigation against select users of Linux.114 Patent assertion entities such as IP Innovations, a subsidiary of Acacia Technologies, have also brought patent suits against prominent users of Linux
such as Red Hat. Some speculate that Microsoft backed the Acacia
litigation against Red Hat.115 Red Hat, which provides services based
110. See, e.g., Elizabeth Montalbano, Update: Microsoft, Novell Strike Linux Deal,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 2, 2006, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9004723/Update_Microsoft_Novell_strike_Linux_deal; Paul Krill, The Microsoft-Novell Linux
Deal: Two Years Later, INFOWORLD (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/d/opensource/microsoft-novell-linux-deal-two-years-later-858.
111. See sources cited supra note 104.
112. See, e.g., Katherine Noyes, Microsoft’s Hand in Novell Deal Bodes Ill for Linux,
PCWORLD (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:12 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/211414/microsofts_
hand_in_novell_deal_bodes_ill_for_linux.html; TECHRIGHTS, http://www.techrights.org/home/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (showing Roy Schestowitz is editor of the site).
113. See, e.g., Mary Jo Foley, Microsoft: Free and Open Source Software Violates 235
Microsoft Patents, ZDNET (May 13, 2007, 4:46 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/microsoft/
microsoft-free-and-open-source-software-violates-235-microsoft-patents/436; Peter Lattman,
Patent Litigation’s Battle Royale: Microsoft v. Open Source, WALL ST. J., LAW BLOG (May
15, 2007. 9:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/15/patent-litigations-battle-royalemicrosoft-v-open-source/.
114. See, e.g., John C. Dvorak, Microsoft’s Nuisance Suit Strategy, PC MAG. (Sept. 21,
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2393361,00.asp.
115. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Hoover, Acacia Research, Linux Patent Adversary, Has Long
Litigation History, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 12, 2007, 4:32 PM), http://www.information
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on Linux, is often heralded as one of the open source software company success stories, making it a natural target for opponents of
Linux. The company complains of having to routinely address “attempts to impede the innovative forces of open source via allegations
of patent infringement.”116 General and widespread threats like those
made by Microsoft increase the real and perceived risks and the
transaction costs of contributing to and using open source software
for all participants in the open source system, with the largest impact
on developers and users who are not affiliated with and protected by
large companies. Even small changes in cost and risk may deter
many users of the resulting software, chill development efforts, and
alter otherwise promising development paths.
The availability of software patents increased the commercial attractiveness of defecting from the FOSS community for Novell and
increased the risks of third party patent infringement suits against
community members.117 These risks ultimately forced community
members to rely heavily on the resources of large commercial participants such as IBM to protect Linux through defensive patenting
strategies. Linux survived despite patent risks and costs largely by
becoming an established part of the business model of major participants in the software industry.118 By some estimates more than half
of the companies in the Fortune 500 are using Linux in their data
centers.119 These large corporate users have invested significant resources both in the development and the protection of the Linux project.120 In response to patent infringement threats made by Microsoft
against Linux, large corporate users of Linux—i.e. IBM, NEC, Novell,
Phillips, Red Hat, and Sony—set up the Open Invention Network
week.com/acacia-research-linux-patent-adversary-has-long-litigation-history/d/d-id/106 0255?;
Roy Schestowitz, Red Hat Pays Microsoft-Linked Patent Troll Again, Refuses to Provide
Details, TECHRIGHTS (May 25, 2013, 7:16 AM), http://techrights.org/2013/05/25/acacia-red-hat/.
116. See, e.g., Soulskill, Red Hat Settles Patent Case, SLASHDOT (Oct. 4, 2010, 6:45 PM),
http://linux.slashdot.org/story/10/10/04/2148218/red-hat-settles-patent-case?sdsrc=rel.
117. See, e.g., Krill, supra note 110.
118. See, e.g., Oliver Alexy & Markus Reitzig, Private-Collective Innovation, Competition,
and Firms’ Counterintuitive Appropriation Strategies, 42 RES. POL’Y 895 (2013) (examining
role of exclusion rights for technology in competition between private-collective and other
innovators); Joel West, How Open Is Open Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source
Platform Strategies, 32 RES. POL’Y 1259 (2003) (examining hybrid strategies and contrasting
them with purely open and purely proprietary software alternatives).
119. Parloff, supra note 11.
120. See, e.g., Dan Woods, Can Intel Heal the Hadoop Open Source Ecosystem?, FORBES
(Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danwoods/2013/02/26/can-intel-heal-thehadoop-open-source-ecosystem/2/ (“In the Linux community the primary contributors are those
who benefit from using Linux in their businesses. IBM, Intel, Google, HP, Oracle all make a
pile of money because Linux solves a variety of problems for them. The amount of value that
they receive from this use dwarfs that captured by Red Hat or Suse, the Linux distributors.
Linux thrives because the big players take part of the massive revenue from the use value and
invest heavily in large development teams.”).
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(OIN) in 2005 to acquire a portfolio of patents that could create problems for companies like Microsoft should they create problems for
Linux users.121 OIN is self-described as “an intellectual property company that was formed to promote the Linux system by using patents to
create a collaborative ecosystem.”122 “Patents owned by OIN are available royalty-free to any [entity] or individual that agrees not to assert
its patents against [the] Linux” system.123 In addition, Open Source
Development Labs, which is the consortium that promotes and coordinates Linux development, established its own patent commons to accept donations of rights to use patents.124 The Patent Commons Project
is self-described as creating an area of safety, “a preserve where developers and users of software can innovate, collaborate, and access patent resources in an environment of enhanced safety, protected by
pledges of support made by holders of software patents.”125
These patent pooling efforts can be seen as a way of trying to preserve the trust and reciprocity on which open source systems depend.
Compliance with group norms is achieved by providing a patent
shield for members who adhere to group norms. Reciprocity is enforced through contingent protections that are available only to participants who do not themselves assert their patents against other
group members or protected open source projects. Other community
responses to the patent threats have included Linux Defenders, an
online clearinghouse for prior art designed to invalidate poor-quality
software patents,126 and a project called A Patent a Day, with its goal
of identifying one Microsoft-owned patent every day that Linux potentially infringes with the goal of helping to get rid of the dependency on these patents and/or get rid of the patents.127 These efforts illustrate the ways in which open source communities must participate
in the patent system simply as a way of protecting their nonproprietary software systems from extinction.
Such efforts come with a very steep price tag both in terms of cost
and in terms of increasingly centralized control over open source.
Monitoring and acquiring patents are ironic ways for an open source

121. Nicholson, supra note 94, at 16; see also OPEN INVENTION NETWORK,
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
122. Nicholson, supra note 94, at 16.
123. OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, supra note 121.
124. See, e.g., Steve Hamm, Linux Marches On, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 16,
2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2005/11/linux_marches_
o.html; see also PATENT COMMONS, http://www.patentcommons.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
125. PATENT COMMONS, supra note 124.
126. LINUX DEFENDERS, http://linuxdefenders.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
127. See PatentSleuth, Introduction Post: A Patent a Day Project, LINUX PATENTS (July
4, 2009, 8:26 AM), http://linuxpatents.blogspot.com/2009/07/introduction-post-patent-dayproject.html.
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community to spend its funds. Reliance on defensive patenting and
pooling strategies also changes the balance of power within the open
source community, giving corporate participants with large patent
holdings control over the directions that open source projects take.
One of the largest corporate supporters of Linux, IBM, also regularly
tops the list of patents filed at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.128 Corporate patent holders like IBM have significant power in
shaping the boundaries of protected open source software spaces,
aligning the boundaries with their own private business interests
and strategies. In addition to favoring some open source software projects but not others, commercial partners of the open source community tend to favor hybrid models in which proprietary and open source
software development coexists.129 While not everybody sees this shift
towards hybrid models as a problem,130 many members of the open
source software community are skeptical that a balance of closed and
open source software will survive.131 Their concerns include the negative impact of hybrid models on the motivations supporting open
source software communities, the shift in control over development
paths for software that impacts private business interests, the high
direct and indirect costs of defensive patents strategies that pervade
this hybrid world, and the threats that patents will continue to pose
for open source models not backed by large corporate users.132
Thus, while private orderings of intellectual property rights such
as defensive patent pooling may serve to mitigate patent threats for
open source software, they do so in a limited and costly way. Patents
continue to challenge the viability of FOSS systems that rely on
128. See, e.g., IBM Earns Most U.S. Patents for 17th Consecutive Year; Will Offer
Licenses to Patent Portfolio Management Know-How, IBM (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/29168.wss.
129. See, e.g., Open-Source Software: Going Hybrid, ECONOMIST, (July 25, 2002), available
at http://www.economist.com/node/1251254; Rosa Maria Ballardini, Proprietary Software vs.
FOSS: Challenges with Hybrid Protection Models (May 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, IPR Univ.
Ctr.), available at http://www.iprinfo.com/julkaisut/verkkojulkaisut/ipr-series-b/en_GB/
proprietary-software-vs-foss/_files/88742337887406149/default/B4_Ballardini_eng.pdf.
130. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 9; Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source
Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2006) (exploring the
symbiotic relationship between proprietary and open source software); Jay P. Kesan, The
Fallacy of OSS Discrimination by FRAND Licensing: An Empirical Analysis (Univ. of Ill.
Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 10-14, 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1767083 (examining compatibility of
OSS licenses with proprietary uses).
131. See, e.g., Sonali K. Shah, Motivation, Governance, and the Viability of Hybrid
Forms in Open Source Software Development, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1000 (2006). For a discussion
of hybrid models and the issues that may arise, see, for example, Vetter, supra note 26.
132. See, e.g., Arnold Polanski, Is the General Public License a Rational Choice?, 55 J.
INDUS. ECON. 691 (2007) (showing that proprietary licensing can lead to a holdup problem
which may terminate a sequence of innovation prematurely, and that free open source
licensing may be able to avoid this).
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keeping costs and risks low and adherence to community norms
based on openness, trust, and reciprocity high.133 I suggest that in the
absence of larger patent reforms addressing concerns with software
patents,134 systematic efforts by courts to take into account the costs
of patents in cooperative contexts may help to limit these costs and to
support a greater diversity of open source software projects.
III. PATENT ROADBLOCKS
As cooperative systems such as crowd science and free and open
source software develop, they must confront patent laws that are designed with a very different model of cooperation in mind. In some cases the incentives that patents create may interfere with the mechanisms of trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity on which these and
other cooperative innovation systems rely, increasing collective action
problems. In other cases, patent laws may help to solve collective action problems. Fashioning the right policy response requires closer
scrutiny of the relationship between patent laws and intellectual production when private incentives and public interests diverge.135
Patents may impede the collective action needed to sustain cooperative innovation in two different ways. First, patents increase the
incentives for individual members of a cooperative system to defect
from group norms of open access and sharing. Where a member of a
group has the opportunity to patent and privately exploit an invention that is useful to the group, this member will be less willing to
share her ideas with the group and may be more likely to free ride on

133. For studies of the survival factors of open source software, see, for example, Kevin
Crowston et al., Free/Libre Open-Source Software Development: What We Know and What
We Do Not Know, 44 ACM COMPUTING SURV. 7:1 (2012); Vishal Midha & Prashant Palvia,
Factors Affecting the Success of Open Source Software, 85 J. SYS. & SOFTWARE 895 (2012);
Jing Wang, Survival Factors for Free Open Source Software Projects: A Multi-Stage Perspective, 30 EUR. MGMT. J. 352 (2012).
134. There is a rich literature identifying and responding to problems with software
patents. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and
the Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399 (2013);
Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 905 (2013); James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 11-31, 2011) (critically examining software patenting practices and impact
on social welfare).
135. For use of game-theoretic models to explore opportunities for using patents to
improve cooperative outcomes, see, for example, Shubha Ghosh, Patent Law and the Assurance
Game: Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE
307 (2005) (referencing the assurance game as an alternative way of thinking about the role of
patent law in regulating innovation). Under the assurance game, more commonly known as
the stag hunt, two hunters can jointly hunt a stag for high payoffs or individually hunt rabbits
for smaller payoffs. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. Hunting
stags is most beneficial for the group but requires significant trust among its members. See
also Ted Sichelman, Quantum Game Theory and Coordination in Intellectual Property (San
Diego Legal Studs., Paper No. 10-035, 2010).
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and exploit the ideas generated by the group. Additionally, a member
may be driven against her interest to seek patent protection for protective reasons, fearing that others will appropriate the benefits from her
contribution without sharing in return. Patents thus increase the individual payoffs from defecting from group norms and may reduce the
payoffs from adhering to group norms. As a result, members of the
group will have reduced expectations that other members will behave
in accordance with group norms of open and free sharing, further
weakening these norms. Members of the group might also place less
value on non-market rewards within the group such as reputation.
Second, patents increase the risks to group members posed by
third parties. The open and transparent nature of intellectual production in contexts of cooperative innovation makes it easy for third
parties to assert patents against the group, and where third parties
have patents covering technologies that are widely used by the group
the third parties will have the ability to hold up the group and collect
more than the incremental value of their technological contribution.
Third parties may also be able to free ride on the intellectual production of the group without any reciprocating contributions. Even generalized threats of third party litigation increase transaction costs for
developers and users of open source software by forcing them into
defensive patent licensing and pooling arrangements which need to
be maintained and enforced. This requires them to spend time examining potential patent risks and planning for potential patent infringement claims, and in some cases induces them to enter licenses
and make royalty payments simply as a way of averting threats from
aggressive patent holders.136 Cooperative systems are particularly
sensitive to these kinds of transaction costs, since they rely on large
numbers of volunteers freely sharing ideas. Even small changes in
the cost of participation—such as the need to reserve funds to respond to cease-and-desist letters from third parties, the learning
costs associated with participating in defensive patent pools, the administrative costs associated with making and using software covered by a growing family of different open source software license
agreements, and small changes in the risk of participation—may
therefore interfere with the continuing operations of the group. In
some cases, these groups survive only by aligning the activities of the
group with the private interests of one or a few large players with
deep pockets and vested interests in the innovation system. By increasing defections from group norms, and by increasing threats from

136. See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 109 (surveying options and some of the costs
involved with these options); see also Nicholson, supra note 94, at 14 (discussing some of the
transaction costs and chilling effects of patents for open source software participants).

2014]

COOPERATIVE INNOVATION

1097

outside the groups, patents may sometimes threaten or distort valuable processes of cooperative innovation.
The disconnect between the needs of cooperative innovation and
the incentives that patents create can be explained in part by patent
law’s attachment to an outdated model of innovation. The U.S. patent
statute, as well as the broader international patent law framework
now in place, is anchored on a paradigm of market-based, producerdriven innovation.137 As a result, the patent statute and implementing laws and regulations deal primarily with the creation, definition,
and enforcement of ownership rights over inventions and the administration of this process.138 The right of the patent owner to exclude
others from use of the invention forms the backbone of patent law,
and most of the statute is devoted to defining and policing these
rights. Patent remedies are designed to restore the patent owner to
the status quo before infringement through the award of reasonable
royalties, lost profits resulting from lost sales or price erosion,139
and/or injunctive relief.140 The statute pays much less attention to the
source and nature of the inputs leading to invention,141 and to how
the subsequent patents are managed and used,142 or, even more importantly, not used.143
Patent law does address issues of team production, but it does so
largely with a focus on identifying the true inventors and protecting
their collective rights through rules governing derivation and joint

137. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 397 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds.,
2002) (examining myth of the individual inventor and disjuncture between current IP law and
issues of importance to collaborators).
138. See 35 U.S.C. (2012). Part I of the statute deals with the establishment and operation
of the USPTO, and Part II focuses primarily on how to obtain a patent, including requirements
for patentability. Part III focuses on protection of patent rights. Part IV deals with the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, addressing international issues relevant to the Act.
139. Compensation to the patent owner extends even to harm from offers to sell. See, e.g.,
Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for
Offering To Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other
Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 756-64 (2003).
140. For a description and critique of this private law focus of patent remedies, see
Sichelman, supra note 19.
141. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011); Lemley,
supra note 9; Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L. J. 919, 929
(2011) (exploring complexity of ensuring that a patent does not issue if the public already
possesses the invention, and joining “a larger project to bridge the disconnect between patent
law and the norms of science”).
142. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60
ALA. L. REV. 103 (2008) (discussing rules dealing with patent management confined to defining
what constitutes infringement, remedies, and patent misuse).
143. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and
Patent Law (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studs. Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12-62,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2162667.

1098

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1067

inventorship. Doctrines of derivation144 and the shared ownership
rules for co-inventors145 protect the rights of those team members who
have either made an invention that is misappropriated or made inventorship contributions to a collective invention. Pursuing derivation or joint inventorship claims is costly, however, and involves evidentiary burdens that may be difficult to satisfy in contexts of massively distributed innovation. In addition, these doctrines do little to
recognize or protect many kinds of valuable contributions to the collective process of intellectual production. To be a joint inventor, an
individual must contribute to the conception of the invention. This
leaves out individuals who make contributions that increase the likelihood of discovery but do not contemplate the discovery and individuals who work hard to reduce the invention to practice. Derivation
proceedings address only situations in which it can be shown that
members of the group actually made an invention that the patent
applicant took without authorization.146 Again, this leaves out many
situations in which the group performs the hard work needed to
make discovery more likely through contributions such as research
tools and ideas about paths not to take, as well as situations in which
the group contributes to the reduction of the invention to practice.
Moreover, both doctrines will be of limited practical relevance for
many cooperative innovation projects that have limited budgets and

144. Derivation refers to situations in which an alleged inventor has derived the claimed
invention from another. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012). Derivation proceedings are costly and
evidence intensive, requiring the challenging inventor(s) to file their own patent application,
file a derivation petition within one year of the first publication of the claimed invention, show
that the invention is “the same or substantially the same” as the earlier claim to the invention,
provided a detailed explanation for claiming unauthorized derivation, and provide substantial
evidence to support the petition. See, e.g., Derivation Proceeding: Overview, AM. INVENTS ACT,
http://www.aiarulemaking.com/rulemaking-topics/group-3/derivation-proceedings.php
(last
visited Mar. 22, 2014). For concerns about the limits of derivation proceedings, see, for
example, N. Scott Pierce, The Effects of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act on Collaborative
Research, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 133 (2012); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and
Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 12; Dennis Crouch,
With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but not
Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-inventorship-now-codifiedin-35-usc-101.html.
145. Where an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they are considered joint
inventors even if they did not work together or make the same kinds or amount of contribution.
35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006). Unless otherwise agreed by contract, they are joint owners of the
resulting patent and are free to use and authorize others to use the invention without the
consent of or accounting to the other owners and all must join in an infringement suit based on
the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2006).
146. See supra note 138; see also Gene Quinn, First Inventor to File: USPTO Derivation
Proceedings Go Final, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:26 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2012/09/10/first-inventor-to-file-uspto-derivation-proceedings-go-final/id=27986/
(describing
derivation proceedings).
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a decentralized, volunteer-based project design that is poorly suited
to the pursuit of legal measures.147
In addition to the doctrines relevant to team production discussed
above, patent law has been amended in response to the special needs
of collaborations among different entities, but once again its response
has been largely confined to ensuring that inventions can be patented
by at least one of the collaborators. When different entities collaborate to innovate, patent law has been adjusted to limit the barriers
that sharing information may pose for patenting inventions that
emerge from the collaboration.148
With respect to how subsequent patents are managed and used, or
not used, the focus in patent law remains on the patent owner’s
rights to exclude others from using the patented invention. Little effort has been made to distinguish between socially beneficial and detrimental kinds of unauthorized patent use.149 Defenses to infringement based on special circumstances of creation and use, such as independent discovery or experimental use, remain narrow even after
changes introduced to patent law by the America Invents Act (AIA)
to expand protections for prior inventors.150 Third parties are generally not free to use the patented invention for any purposes, not even
for experimentation or to confirm that the invention actually works
as disclosed in the patent. Concepts of protecting certain kinds of
publicly beneficial uses, such as the fair use found in copyright law,
are missing altogether from the patent statute.151
147. See Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U.
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 73 (2012) (discussing problems with claim fixation in inventorship
and consequences for collaborative research).
148. See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-453, 118 Stat. 3596 (amending Section 103 of the Patent Act). For a discussion of
the CREATE Act, including some potential concerns that it may pose for participants in
collaborations, see Liza S. Vertinsky, Understanding and Applying the CREATE Act in
Collaborations, in 3 AUTM TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PRACTICE MANUAL (3d ed. 2008); see also
Pierce, supra note 144.
149. This may be changing, albeit in a limited way, as courts and perhaps even Congress
respond to the challenges that patents covering standards essential to critical technologies
have created. See Part IV.A.
150. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 9 (examining the disconnect between traditional theories
of patent law and real-world experience, particularly in the context of independent invention).
The AIA expands the protection for prior inventors. It provides a “prior use defense” to patent
infringement that protects parties who can establish that they have in good faith commercially
used a product or process covered by a patent at least one year before the earlier of the public
disclosure or the effective filling date of the patent disclosing the invention. Although more
robust than the one it replaced, it includes a number of limitations. See U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE (2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_report.pdf.
151. See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing that new technology has put pressure on patent laws that
increasingly interfere with follow on innovation, and proposes a doctrine of fair use in patent
law to relieve some of this pressure); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C.
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Members of a community that contribute valuable ideas to the inventor are simply out of luck unless they have the resources and the
ability to show that they are joint inventors, that their invention was
derived from them, or that the patented invention would be obvious
to individual community members in light of the combined
knowledge and effort of the community.152 Determining who contributed what to an invention in a collaborative effort is difficult, particularly where innovation takes the form of cumulative, incremental
contributions by many participants.153 Showing that an invention was
derived from the cumulative, widely-shared discoveries of the group
is likely to be both costly and challenging. The limits that nonobviousness imposes on patentability are also unlikely to provide adequate protection for collective intellectual production.154 Even if a
group can find and present prior art challenging the novelty of a patent, they must overcome the legal presumption that the patent is
valid. This presumption holds regardless of whether the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office considered the prior art when granting the
patent.155 Patent law, both on the books and as applied, remains too
heavily oriented around the patent ownership rights of the pioneering lone inventors and their assignees. In doing so, patent law neglects the needs of other very different forms of intellectual production such as cooperative innovation.156
This is not to suggest that patents are always or even mostly a
constraint on innovation or that innovation would increase in the ab-

IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011) (arguing that there should be greater use of defenses and
exemptions to patent infringement to respond to the different contexts in which inventions are
used); see also Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use”
and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779 (2005) (arguing that a
doctrine of fair use will help reduce negative externalities and clarify expectations on what
type of infringement is actionable).
152. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (addressing conditions for patentability and nonobvious subject matter); supra note 75 (discussing joint inventorship); supra note 144
(discussing derivation).
153. See also Dennis Crouch, Inventorship: Limits of Collaboration, PATENTLY-O (Apr.
1, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/inventorship-limits-of-collaboration.html (discussing outcome of Rubin v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., 523 F. App’x 719 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
154. See, e.g., Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and
Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012) (suggesting patents
are being awarded with negligible innovation value); see also Gregory Mandel, The NonObvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent
Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57 (2008).
155. See, e.g., Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
156. While the requirement to disclose the invention could be seen as facilitating
sharing, it is at best a limited form of sharing. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 132-34 (pointing out the disconnect between role of
disclosure as teaching and theory of combating free-riding, suggests that we think of the
function of disclosure as possession).
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sence of patents.157 Patents play important roles in attracting resources and providing market incentives for proprietary, producerdriven innovation.158 Patents can also enable limited departures from
closed, producer-driven systems of innovation by supporting open innovation models in which companies sell or license out unused technologies and acquire or license in third party discoveries.159 Where
patents interfere with cooperation that patent owners are interested
in preserving, the patent owners can create their own contract-based
forms of sharing and pooling patent rights. Patent pools,160 licensing
strategies that incorporate broader public objectives and public uses
into the license terms,161 and patent licensing strategies modeled on
those employed by open source software,162 can and do operate to preserve areas of cooperation.163 Moreover, existing rules and doctrines
such as joint inventorship and the limiting effects of prior art and
derivation on patentability in contexts of cumulative intellectual production mitigate some of the incentive problems that patents might
otherwise create for cooperative innovation.
While these legal tools and private arrangements are helpful in
making room for cooperative innovation, they do not adequately address the harmful incentive effects of patents on non-market mecha157. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization,
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Law of Organization] (discussing
the role of patents in supporting disaggregation of innovation process); Barnett, The
Illusion of the Commons, supra note 20 (examining the importance of property in
supporting sharing regimes).
158. Strong patent rights may facilitate coordination among many different market
players by reducing transaction costs, solving problems of incomplete contracting, signaling
firm value, or facilitating bargains over use of the patent rights. See, e.g., Ashish Arora &
Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Barnett, Law of Organization, supra note 157 (patents
as facilitating specialization); Heald, supra note 20 (discussing the role of patents in
solving team production problems and facilitating technology transfer through transaction
cost savings); Kieff, supra note 20 (focusing on the role of patents in facilitating
coordination among many diverse complementary users of an asset in a way that increases
competition and access).
159. See, e.g., Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for
Understanding Industrial Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW
PARADIGM (Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006) (defining open
innovation as “a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as
well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as they look to advance
their technology”); see also Barnett, Law of Organization, supra note 157.
160. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The
Case of Patent Pools, BERKELEY L. (1999), https://2048.berkeley.edu/files/pools.pdf.
161. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); Peter
Lee, Contracting To Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law,
58 EMORY L.J. 889, 915 (2009).
162. See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 109.
163. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 183 (2004) (examining private efforts to self-correct for excesses of patents).
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nisms important to some forms of cooperative innovation. The doctrinal tools available to support collaboration remain tethered to a market-based, producer-driven model of innovation. They do little to support the kinds of exchanges that are needed in a volunteer-driven
system of combined intellectual production. In many cases, the private measures are inherently incomplete, primarily or even solely
defensive in nature, and often extremely expensive.164 Some of the
strategies used to preserve openness may even backfire if patents
obtained for defensive purposes later become litigation tools.
Despite mitigating doctrines and private market responses,165
patents as currently enforced can and do systematically and significantly disadvantage some forms of cooperative innovation.166 Since
it is effectively impossible to opt out of the patent system, change
may be needed from within patent law to give forms of cooperative
innovation that are vulnerable to patents a chance to compete.167 In
addition, the public nature of a change in the law might have expressive effects missing from private efforts to circumvent the law, effects
that would help to strengthen group norms and values important to
cooperative systems.168
In Part IV, I propose one way for courts to respond to the vulnerabilities of cooperative innovation systems without radically changing
164. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 109, at 805 (describing the costs involved in trying to
preserve open systems of knowledge exchange through private orderings); Mattioli, supra
note 17, at 108 (examining question of whether patent sharing reflects a form of market
self-regulation, and critiquing view that private ordering can always correct for excessive
apportionment of patent rights).
165. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §§ 3.4, 4, and 5.6 (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (discussing the use of the rule of
reason to evaluate various kinds of IP agreements and arrangements); Sheila F. Anthony,
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1
(2000) (discussing intersection of IP and antitrust, key focus of antitrust on precompetitive
nature of various agreements and arrangements involving IP).
166. For example, as work by Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom and others on the
management of common pool resources has shown, external legal rights that control allocations within the group may interfere with valuable non-market forms of cooperation that
could achieve better collective outcomes. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A
COMMONS, supra note 31, at 7 (including design principles for managing the production of
knowledge, viewed as a common pool resource; emphasizing importance of trust and reciprocity in sustaining cooperative systems; and emphasizing role of locally designed rules).
167. See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 109, at 10.
168. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (exploring the role of expressive incentives, those that express
solicitude for and protect a creator’s strong personhood and labor interests, in patent law);
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 613 (2006)
(exploring the expressive impact that patent law can have, looking at how the grant of a
patent could communicate a message of inferiority to groups whose identity is tied to their
biology); William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 391 (2011) (arguing that
patent law has an important role to play in supporting “inventing norms” and that these
inventing norms should be incorporated into traditional patent law analysis).
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the patent system. Recent pressures on the patent system fueled by
patent wars over the use of critical technology standards have created opportunities to make room for cooperative innovation in discussions about patent remedies. Rather than adding to the costs and uncertainties associated with broader judicial discretion in patent remedies, the principles I suggest might even act to limit existing uncertainties by providing a focal point for how patent remedies should be
adjusted and limiting the areas in which they are to be adjusted.
IV. PATENT REMEDIES WITH COOPERATION IN MIND
Patent remedies have become the topic of increasing public interest and debate as the social costs of patent litigation mount and the
divergence of public and private interests in laws governing patent
remedies become more apparent.169 In the pages that follow I show
why, when, and how we should make patent remedies more responsive to the needs of cooperative innovation.
A. Remedies Without Context
Patent remedies have historically been based on measuring and
awarding reasonable compensation for past infringement to the owner of a valid, infringed patent, generally accompanied by injunctive
relief to preclude future infringement.170 The patent owner has been
entitled to no less than a reasonable royalty, generally defined as the
royalty that a willing licensor and licensee would have agreed to at the
time of the initial infringement.171 Historically, courts would also routinely provide the plaintiff patent owner with injunctive relief preclud-

169. See James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Interest, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 30 (2012); Thomas F. Cotter, Reining in Remedies in Patent
Litigation: Three (Increasingly Immodest) Proposals, 30 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1 (2014); Ghosh, supra note 135; Golden, supra note 18, at 507 (“In legislative debates, public-choice concerns loom large, as proposed reforms appear commonly to track private, rather than necessarily public, interests.”); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public
Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41 (2012); Rajec, supra note 19; Sichelman, supra note 19.
170. See also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). The Patent Act provides that the owner of a valid,
infringed patent is entitled to damages that are “adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer” with the possibility of punitive damages for willful infringement. Id.
171. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1676-81 (discussing Federal
Circuit approach to reasonable royalties). Monetary remedies for patent infringement may
take the form of either lost profits or lost royalties. In practice, however, determining what the
appropriate monetary remedies are has been “a complicated and confusing task.” Roger D.
Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1, 2 (2001)
(providing overview of traditional approaches to lost profits and reasonable royalties and
suggesting economic framework to aid in rethinking how patent damages are calculated).
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ing further infringing activity by the defendant.172 This approach to
patent remedies aligns roughly with the reward function of patents
within the traditional paradigm of producer-driven, market-based innovation. Focusing on compensation to the patent owner, however,
may result in patent remedies that decrease rather than increase innovation in some contexts of cooperative intellectual production.173
One of the biggest limitations of the traditional approach to patent
remedies has been its focus on the interests of the patent owner, to
the exclusion of the interests of additional participants in the innovation process and the broader public interests in socially optimal levels
of innovation.174 Interests beyond those of the patent owner, including
both the infringer and the public more generally, started to play a
bigger role in the calculation of patent remedies following the Supreme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange in 2006.175 The Supreme Court held in eBay that injunctive relief in patent cases, just
as in other types of cases, should not be presumed but rather should
be determined based on the conventional four-factor test for injunctive relief.176 The Supreme Court thus shifted the calculus used by
courts when determining whether to award injunctive relief to the
owner of an infringed patent by requiring courts to take the harm of
an injunction to the public and the defendant explicitly into account.177 Justice Kennedy’s influential concurring opinion went on to

172. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“It
is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged,
absent a sound reason for denying it.”).
173. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 517 (2014); see also Boyle, supra note 169, at 32-34 (outlining some of the ways in
which open source innovation is particularly vulnerable to patent injunctions); Thomas R.
Cotter, Make No Little Plans: Response to Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private
Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 25 (2014); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent
Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165 (2008).
174. Patent remedies take the form of injunctive relief and damages. Damages are
based on calculations of loss to the patent owner, either in the form of a patent owner’s lost
profits, price erosion, or reasonable royalties. See, e.g., THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE
PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2013) (comprehensively discussing
patent remedies in the United States and selected other countries). The works referenced
in footnote 171 highlight various limitations of the traditional approach to remedies taken
by the courts.
175. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that the wellestablished principles of equitable relief apply with equal force to disputes under the
Patent Act).
176. Id. at 391-93. This case replaced the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” in favor of
granting injunctions based on a presumption of irreparable harm with a required
balancing of interests. To obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that it has
suffered irreparable harm, remedies available under the law are inadequate to
compensate, the balance of hardships associated with injunctive relief favor the plaintiff,
and the public interest will not suffer by the issuance of the requested injunction. Id.
177. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 253 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]; see also
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suggest specific situations in which district courts might find injunctive relief inappropriate, such as patent assertion by non-practicing
entities and situations of patent holdup.178
While eBay has made the role of the public interest explicit in determinations of injunctive relief, the case fails to provide principles to
guide courts in their determinations of what the public interest is or
how it should be measured.179 Courts have taken into account a
greater variety of factors when determining whether an injunction
should be awarded, although many of these considerations remain
focused on whether the patent owner will suffer irreparable harm
due to the infringement through loss of market share, price erosion,
difficulty in calculating damages, or harm to reputation or goodwill.180 Whether the patent owner and infringer compete and whether
the patent owner is a practicing entity appear to be important but
not determining factors in predicting the availability of injunctive
relief, and factors such as market structure and the relationship of
the patented invention to the infringing product increasingly inform
court decisions.181 Despite the more contextualized analysis of the
effects of infringement and injunctive relief, however, detailed analysis of the effects of injunctive relief on the broader public interest
Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 204-05 (2012)
(suggesting that the eBay case has launched a revolution in the law of equitable remedies
beyond patent law).
178. See, e.g., eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 255 (“After enumerating the four
equitable factors in the eBay decision, the opinion of the full Court gave little guidance on
their application.”); see also Scott A. Allen, “Justifying” the Public Interest in Patent
Litigation, 88 IND. L.J. 1047, 1051 (2013).
180. FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 215 (discussing the ways in which courts have
considered and applied the four factors in the test for injunctive relief); see also James M.
Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 564-65
(2010); Stephen E. Noona, Permanent Injunctions for Patent Infringement in a Post eBay
World, INSIDE BUS. (Dec. 9, 2010, 4:12 AM), http://insidebiz.com/blogs/kaufman-canoles/
permanent-injunctions-patent-infringement-post-ebay-world; Bryan J. Vogel & Shane St.
Hill, IP: Injunctions and Irreparable Harm After eBay, INSIDECOUNSEL (June 19, 2012),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/19/ip-injunctions-and-irreparable-harm-after-ebay.
181. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 259 (showing results of survey of case
law); see also eBay, 547 U.S. at 393 (Supreme Court’s warning against categorical rules in
injunction analysis); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631 (2007); Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange:
The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543 (2008)
(arguing the importance of factors such as whether infringer is a competitor and showing of
irreparable harm in post-eBay cases). For a more recent update that largely affirms the
importance of whether the parties were competitors and the ability to show irreparable
harm, see, for example, Barbara A. Fiacco, The Impact of eBay v. MercExchange,
Presentation at the Duke Pat. Law Inst. (May 16, 2013) (presentation available at
http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/patentlawintensive/Fiacco-Ma
y%2016%20eBay%20v%20MercExchange.pdf).
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remains rare except in situations in which injunctions would have
severe consequences for public health and safety or would significantly disrupt markets, or more recently in situations where patents
cover important industry standards.182 Instead of conducting a broader inquiry into the effects of injunctions on innovation, some courts
still simply equate the public interest with supporting innovation
through a strong patent system.183 Although injunctive relief is
no longer routine in the wake of eBay, injunctive relief seems to be
based most frequently on a showing of irreparable harm to the patent
owner and continues to be granted in the majority of cases.184 Thus,
while determinations of injunctive relief following eBay have moved
patent remedies in the direction of reflecting a richer range of
entitlements, I suggest that courts still have not adequately captured
the public interest in limiting injunctive relief or given it sufficient
context or weight.
This limited approach to the public interest may be starting to
change, particularly in the context of cases involving patents that are
essential to the use of important industry-wide technology stand182. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 232-34 (discussing the role of public
interest, including survey of cases that address public interest explicitly as part of decision
to award or deny injunctive relief). Greater attention to the public interest does seem to
occur in cases involving substantial network effects that are threatened by patents. See,
e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (taking
impact on consumers into account and denying injunctive relief despite status of parties as
direct competitors); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(affirming District Court’s denial of injunctive relief despite status of parties as direct competitors for design patents, but vacating denial of injunctive relief for utility patents).
183. FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 270-271 (“Only a small number of post-eBay cases
have provided an extended discussion of this factor in deciding whether to grant an
injunction. In the majority of cases, courts simply recognize that the ‘public has an interest
in maintaining a strong patent system. This interest is served by enforcing an adequate
remedy for patent infringement.’ ” (quoting TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F.
Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006)); see also, e.g., Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 825 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (reasoning that an injunction served the public interest
because it encouraged innovation by upholding patent owner’s “right to exclude”); Zen
Design Grp., Ltd. v. Clint, No. 08-cv-14309, 2009 WL 4050247, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23,
2009) (reasoning that a permanent injunction served the public interest because, without
it, the patent’s actual value would be reduced to “a fraction of its intended value”); Funai
Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(“Protection of the rights of patent holders is generally in the public interest.”).
184. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 217-218 (“Surveys of post-eBay cases
reveal that district courts have granted approximately 72%–77% of permanent injunction
requests.”); see also Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v.
MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov.
2009, at 25, 26 (noting that seventy two percent of requests were granted through May 1,
2009, based on review of decisions available through Lexis); Erin Coe, Injunctions Harder To
Win in Post-EBay Courts, LAW360 (Oct. 30, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/74829/injunctions-harder-to-win-in-post-ebay-courts; Post-eBay Permanent Injunction
Rulings in Patent Cases, PATSTATS.ORG, http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last
updated May 26, 2013) (showing that injunctions were granted in 167 cases and denied in
55 cases, that is, granted seventy-five percent of the time).
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ards.185 In a series of high-profile patent infringement cases involving
patents covering technology standards used in the smartphone industry, courts have had to consider whether injunctive relief should
be available where patent owners have previously agreed to license
patents essential to the use of these standards on reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms. In one of the first court decisions to weigh
in on this matter, Judge Posner suggested that injunctive relief
should not be available, emphasizing the harm to the public interest
that such relief would impose.186 Judge Posner went on to suggest
that if the patent owner and infringer cannot agree on licensing
terms, compulsory licensing with ongoing royalties should be used to
resolve the dispute in a way that appropriately balances the harm to
the patentee from infringement with the harm to the infringer and to
the public from an injunction.187 This approach focuses explicitly on
what the public interest is and how it should be reflected in determinations of patent remedies in standard setting contexts.188 While
Judge Posner’s willingness to radically reshape how remedies are
calculated diverges from the mainstream,189 his underlying message
about the need to reconsider patent remedies in contexts where they
may threaten important forms of coordination and cooperation is being taken seriously by policymakers. So far, however, this reconsid185. For an optimistic view of this change more generally, see, for example, Boyle,
supra note 169. On the other hand, one fragmented opinion from the Federal Circuit
illustrates the divergence of views held by judges in that court about when injunctive
relieve should be available in the context of patents covering important industry standards.
See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 12-1548, 12-1549, 2014 WL 1646435, at *30-35 (Fed.
Cir. April 25, 2014); id. at *36-37 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part); id. at *43-46 (Prost, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913-14 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, Apple Inc., 2014 WL 1646435. (suggesting that the purpose of the
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND) requirement is “to confine the
patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent itself as distinct from the
additional value—the hold-up value—conferred by the patent’s being designated as
standard-essential”). But see Apple, Inc., 2014 WL 1646435, at *35 (affirming Judge
Posner’s ruling that this particular holder of the patent subject to FRAND requirements
was not entitled to injunctive relief, but insisting that eBay analysis of factors, with
particular attention to whether patent holder will suffer irreparable harm as a result of the
infringement, is required).
187. Apple Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
188. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
189. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader on the Supreme Court and Judge Posner,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 17, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/03/17/chiefjudge-rader-on-the-supreme-court-and-judge-posner/id=37620/; see also Apple, Inc., 2014
WL 1646435, at *35 (holding that Judge Posner erred in his district court opinion by
applying “a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for [standard-essential patents]”);
id. at *36-37 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part) (reasoning that the district court’s failure to
consider the appropriate factors left it “adrift without a map”); id. at *45 (Prost, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the district court’s “categorical rule
that a patentee can never obtain an injunction on a FRAND-committed patent”).
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eration has been limited primarily to the context of standardessential patents encumbered by contractual commitments to license
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.190
Calculations of patent damages have also moved in the direction
of a more contextualized analysis, driven largely by decisions in the
standard setting context. In the first court decision to confront and
calculate reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties for patents essential to the use of industry standards, Judge Robart concluded in
Microsoft v. Motorola that the traditional factors used to determine
reasonable royalties, referred to as the Georgia-Pacific factors, should
be explicitly modified to take the standard-setting context into account.191 Judge Robart, as Judge Posner had before him, emphasized
the importance of the public interest in access to the standards and
190. Judge Posner’s approach in Apple v. Motorola is contrasted with Judge Robart’s
ruling on FRAND damages in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013
WL 2111217, at *18-19 (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013). Areas of divergence include Judge
Robart’s reliance on the traditional Georgia-Pacific factors as a good way of calculating
patent damages, and Judge Posner’s rejection of this framework. Compare id.
(summarizing Judge Robart’s position), with Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 910-11 (giving
Judge Posner’s take). Judge Posner also insists that the FRAND value of a standardessential patent should be determined ex ante, pre-standardization, as compared to the
traditional approach based on the date that infringement began. See, e.g., Florian Mueller,
A Closer Look at the 207-Page, Landmark FRAND Rate-Setting Decision in Microsoft v.
Motorola, FOSS PATENTS (Apr. 28, 2013, 11:49 PM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/acloser-look-at-207-page-landmark.html#judgesrobartandposner. Both decisions, however,
point to the importance of the public interest in access to standard-essential patents
and the need to exclude the holdup value of patents covering standards from
royalty determinations.
191. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *1, 18 (deciding in contract dispute
over whether Motorola had breached contract to offer patents on FRAND terms by asking
for royalties that were unreasonably high). Judge Robart’s decision seems to explicitly
modify the traditional Georgia-Pacific factors to account for the standard-setting context.
Id. at *18-20. He recognizes that the licensing of standard-essential patents takes on a
public character and must be conducted and reviewed with those public benefits in mind.
He emphasizes, for example, that patent royalties should not incorporate the holdup value
that may result after a standard incorporating the patent has been chosen, and attention
to royalty stacking. Id.; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Some Initial Reactions to Judge Robart’s
Opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, INTELLECTUALIP (May 3, 2013), http://intellectual
ip.com/2013/05/03/some-initial-reactions-to-judge-robarts-opinion-in-microsoft-v-motorola/;
Michael Carrier, A US Court Issues First Analysis of an Appropriate Royalty that a
Patentee Could Obtain After Promising To License Its Patent on Reasonable and
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Terms (Microsoft v Motorola), E-COMPETITIONS BULL. (Inst. of
Competition Law, New York, N.Y.), May 2013; Jorge L. Contreras, So That’s What “RAND”
Means?: A Brief Report on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Microsoft v.
Motorola, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 27, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/so-thats-whatrand-means-a-brief-report-on-the-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law-in-microsoft-vmotorola.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Day 2 of the University of Florida Workshop on Standard
Essential Patents and FRAND: Page on “Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/RAND and
Antitrust Injury”, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Sept. 12, 2013), http://comparativepat
entremedies.blogspot.com/2013/09/day-2-of-university-of-florida-workshop_12.html (summarizing comments by William Page suggesting that while the form of FRAND royalties was
as a hypothetical bilateral negotiation, in reality it was a calculation in light of the
economic consensus of what FRAND rates should be).

2014]

COOPERATIVE INNOVATION

1109

the need to exclude any patent holdup value arising from the collective adoption of a standard covered by the patent from the calculation
of damages. Judge Robart’s approach, including the emphasis on excluding the value of standardization in royalty determinations, has
been followed in a second court ruling on reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalty rates.192 Recognizing the strong public interest
in using standards as mechanisms for coordinating interoperable
technologies, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and even the U.S. Trade
Representative have all offered similar opinions about limiting injunctive relief and damages.193 Courts and policymakers alike are
thus emphasizing the public interest in preserving access to innovative standards, and their responses illustrate ways in which the
broader effects of patent remedies on cooperation in innovation can
be incorporated into remedy determinations.194 So far, however, they
remain limited primarily to patents essential to common industry
technology standards.195 They also remain focused primarily on determinations of injunctive relief and damages for past infringement,
leaving open questions about whether the public interest will similar-

192. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 915-17
(N.D. Ill. 2013); see also Michael Carrier, A US Court Issues Second Ruling Determining
RAND Rate for Standard Essential Patent (Innovatio), E-COMPETITIONS BULL. (Inst. of
Competition Law, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2013.
193. See, e.g., Editorial Board, FTC/DOJ/USPTO Take Action on Standards-Essential
Patents, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION NEWSL., ORRICK (Feb. 4, 2013), http://blogs.orrick.com/
antitrust/2013/02/04/dojftcuspto-take-action-on-standards-essential-patents/ (summarizing
recent actions by FTC, DOJ, and USPTO with regard to standard-essential patents); John
Ribeiro, Google Withdraws Standard-Essential Patent Claims in Xbox Complaint,
COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 9 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9235502/google_withdraws_standard_essential_patent_claims_in_Xbox_complaint; see also
Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, Exec. Off. of the President, to Irving A.
Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF (discussing a policy
decision to disapprove Commission’s determination to enjoin Apple from importing and
selling infringing devices, after review in light of public interest concerns).
194. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Remedies for the Infringement of Standard Essential
Patents Subject to a FRAND Commitment, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (May 8, 2013, 9:40
AM), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/05/remedies-for-infringementof-standard.html.
195. Existing proposals in the literature focus primarily on risks of patent holdup and
related forms of opportunistic behavior by patent holders. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 19;
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and
One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007); Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel
Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2009); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard
Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND.
L. REV. 351 (2007). While I am also concerned with patent holdup, my concerns extend to
other ways in which patents might interfere with cooperative innovation, and my goal is to
limit patent remedies when, and to the extent, that the presence of patents makes useful
cooperative systems of innovation unviable.
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ly inform determinations of ongoing royalties where injunctive relief
is denied.196
These responses to cooperative contexts, while creating opportunities to inject broader public interests into determinations of patent
remedies, leave open important questions about how tensions between patents and systems that rely more heavily on non-market
mechanisms of cooperation should be handled. They address only
problems arising from commercial participants in standard setting
organizations who do not honor their obligations to each other relating to standard-essential patents. They limit their focus to the potential harms to the public from refusals of both patent-holding members of standard setting and the users of patented standards to negotiate licenses to patents essential to innovative standards on terms
that are reasonable and non-discriminatory. Moreover, they fail to
acknowledge or protect the public interest in sustaining non-market
mechanisms of cooperation that are valuable to innovation. The principles proposed below are largely consistent with but go further than
existing policy responses. They provide the courts with a way of systematically incorporating the harm that patents impose on cooperative systems into determinations of patent remedies.197
B. Principles for the Design of Remedies
Where patent rights impact systems of cooperative innovation,
these negative effects should be included in determinations of patent
remedies.198 As the examples of Foldit and open source software
demonstrated, three key non-market mechanisms play important
roles in sustaining cooperative innovation: trust, benefit-sharing, and
reciprocity.199 Patents under the current system directly threaten

196. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties
in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725
(2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV.
695 (2011); see also Thomas F. Cotter, U.S. District Court Awards Carnegie Mellon $1.5
Billion in Patent Damages, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Apr. 21, 2014), http://comparative
patentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/04/us-district-court-awards-carnegie.html
(suggesting
decision not to award a higher ongoing royalty than the reasonable royalties awarded for
past infringement is consistent with view that courts should take socially optimal
incentives to innovate into account).
197. Ideally this is just a first step in thinking more systematically about where
patent laws need to change in response to changing forms of collaborative and
cooperative innovation.
198. For a related discussion and insights into the challenges of cumulative and
sequential innovation and the disconnect with current approaches to patent remedies, see,
for example, J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000). For a similar discussion focusing
on open source innovation, see, for example, James Boyle, supra note 169.
199. As noted earlier, there are other important aspects of cooperative innovation
systems that may not be fully captured by these three mechanisms. I focus on them for
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each of these mechanisms, putting such cooperative innovation systems at risk. In response, I provide three principles for courts to use
in determining patent remedies that are designed to protect the operation of these mechanisms in situations of socially beneficial cooperative innovation. The three principles are: (1) protect reliance interests in norms of open access and sharing;200 (2) limit the private
appropriation of collective value;201 and (3) reinforce reciprocity in
free, open systems of innovation. Where the negative effects of patents on cooperative mechanisms are likely to be strong, the principles provide a reasoned way of incorporating these patent harms into
determinations of patent remedies. This approach would lead not only to changes in how courts determine remedies for patents that arise
from or cover the activities of cooperative systems of innovation, but
also, and more importantly, to changes in ex ante decisions by members of a cooperative innovation system about whether to defect from
the system and decisions by third parties about whether and when to
obtain and enforce patents against members of the cooperative system in the first place.202 It is these ex ante effects on decisions to de-

the purpose of this analysis because they seem to play an important role in many of
the cooperative systems and also seem to capture many of the effects that patents
might have on the rich variety of non-economic factors and motivations that drive
cooperative innovation.
200. The idea of respecting the reliance interests of firms in standards that are adopted
by the industry has been suggested in Merges & Kuhn, supra note 195. This principle goes
further, extending to any situation in which multiple participants work collectively to
advance a particular product or field and either must coordinate their activities through
standards and/or find it necessary to use certain core technologies as research tools or
platform technologies on which to build their contributions. There are also similarities here
to an essential-facilities doctrine approach to intellectual property. See, e.g., M. Elaine
Johnston, Intellectual Property As an “Essential Facility”, 22 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 17
(2005) (summarizing case law and trends in applying essential-facilities doctrine to
intellectual property contexts). Jorge Contreras proposes a “market reliance” approach in
the context of promises not to assert patents on FRAND terms, focusing on the importance
of protecting the reasonable reliance of third-party market participants on such promises.
His work provides additional ideas about how this kind of principle might work in the
context of cooperative innovation. See Jorge L. Contreras, Market Reliance and Patent
Pledges, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2309023.
201. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 169 (arguing that damages should be apportioned
according to relative value of patent to the whole product); Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 195 (exploring problems of patent holdup, royalty-stacking, and consequent
royalty overcharges).
202. The principles will have the effect of limiting injunctive relief and patent damages
in ways that reduce the payoffs that group members might expect from defecting and their
expectations that others might defect. This will, in turn, reduce the incentives of group
members to defect from the group in the first place, and will also strengthen the
motivations of group members to continue to adhere to group norms of open access and
sharing. The principles will also limit the ability of outside parties to appropriate the value
arising from collective efforts and their ability to threaten the activities of the group. Third
parties will have lower expected payoffs from asserting or threatening to assert patents
against the group in contexts where they are seeking to tax or free ride on the collective
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fect and decisions to threaten and enforce patents against the group
that are most important to the survival of cooperative innovation.
1. First Principle
The first principle requires courts to protect reliance interests in
norms of open access and sharing. Where the norms are supporting
socially valuable innovation, reliance interests in continued access
to an invention based on this norm should be treated as part of the
public interest in continued access, to be balanced against the
interests of a patent owner in restricting access when fashioning patent remedies.203 To receive protection, the reliance must be reasonable in light of widely adopted and publicly known norms governing
when and how knowledge will be shared and used. It must be reliance on a norm of open access and sharing that is relevant to the cooperative process of innovation. Defining what is reasonable reliance
would thus be context-specific, depending on the scope and nature of
the norms and customs of the innovation community, the extent to
which these norms are publicly known, the relationship of the inventor and patent owner to the community, and the balancing of collective interests in access and private incentives to make and develop
the patented technology.
This approach provides courts with a way of respecting and reinforcing informal rules that establish socially beneficial uses of
knowledge by giving them weight when balancing public and private
interests. Pursuant to this principle, reasonable reliance on norms of
open access and sharing would become an important factor that
weighs against injunctive relief. This reliance would also become a
factor limiting damages for infringement of patented inventions that
are used in the context of cooperative innovation.204 Calculations of
reasonable royalties should be lower where reliance interests are
efforts of the group and less bargaining power in situations where injunctive relief is likely
to be unavailable. This may discourage them from asserting claims or making threats and
will also limit the deterrent effects of potential third-party claims on participation rates in
cooperative-innovation projects. Where licenses are required, third parties will settle for
lower royalties based on expectations that courts will limit injunctive relief and damages.
203. This principle finds support in studies of the role that informal norms play in
knowledge communities. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source
Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Univ. of Wis. Law
Sch. Conf. on the Legal Hist. of Intell. Prop., Working Paper, 2004).
204. For discussions of the effects of patents on norms, see, for example, Merges, supra
note 68; Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary
Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009) (exploring
implications of convergence of academic research with commercial interests and
implications for norms of sharing research tools and materials and suggesting need for
policies to enhance sharing); Murray & Stern, supra note 25; Fiona Murray, The
Oncomouse that Roared: Resistance & Accommodation to Patenting in Academic Science
(March 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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higher and royalties should reflect the economic constraints of the
group. Courts would apply this principle with the goal of reducing the
attractiveness for members of a cooperative system to deviate from
sharing norms, and to limit at least some of the third-party actions
that increase the cost of adhering to group norms of sharing. While
finding a way to measure and account for this reliance interest will
be difficult, courts, as a starting point, can look to the emerging
framework for determining when injunctive relief should be available
and what reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalties are in the
standard-setting context.
While existing doctrines of implied license and estoppel, as well as
the shop rights that a company may have over its employees’ inventions, go part of the way towards recognizing and protecting reasonable reliance in continued group use of inventions, this first principle
goes beyond the limits of these doctrines.205 The principle would encompass the reliance interests of participants who are not in contractual privity, or even in direct or indirect communication, with the patent owner, as long as the norms of open access and sharing that the
group relies upon are widely adopted and publicly known and are associated with a socially valuable system of innovation. Protection of
the reliance interest in continued use will be strongest for inventions
discovered by members of the group that are used by the group. It
will extend in a more limited way to inventions made by group members working on independent projects entirely outside of the group,
and in an even more limited way to inventions owned by third parties
that the group uses. In these latter two cases, the reliance interest
will play a role only for inventions that are both closely related and
important to the activities of the group and additionally made accessible to the group in ways that encourage, whether directly or indirectly, widespread use by the group. If a software company benefits
from Linux and makes available software tools with a reasonable expectation that members of the Linux community will pick up and
widely use the tools, for example, the principle would limit the remedies that the software company might expect from asserting patents
covering this software. The principle would also weigh against injunctive relief and limit damages in situations such as the generalized patent threats made by Microsoft to Linux users. Knowing that
205. See, e.g., Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 939-40 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (holding that a competitor’s adoption of set standards can constitute reasonable reliance); Lautzenhiser Techs., LLC v. Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1009
(S.D. Ind. 2010) (holding that amicable dealings over a period of years may be enough to
constitute misleading conduct that induces reasonable reliance). Similar trends are evident
in contract law, where courts are increasingly willing to protect reasonable reliance interests of negotiating parties prior to or in the absence of a final contract. See, e.g., Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120
HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007).
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injunctive relief and remedies will be limited, Linux users would feel
more comfortable continuing to participate in open source software,
and Microsoft would find its divide-and-conquer strategies less effective. In contrast, this principle would not block injunctive relief or
limit damages in situations of blatant copying of an independent proprietary product for the purpose of making it open source.
Where established norms of open access and sharing govern intellectual production and members have expectations of continued access to and use of inventions based on these norms, protecting their
reliance interests in this way makes it easier to maintain the swift
trust that both open source software systems and crowd science systems rely on.206 Participants in cooperative innovation make contributions and adhere to group rules with the expectation that others
will do the same. Sustaining this kind of trust in the behavior of the
group requires participation by most, if not almost all, members of
the group. Anything that increases the ability and incentives of group
members to defect from group norms will threaten this equilibrium
state of general trust and make it harder to sustain norms of open
access and free sharing. In the Linux example, one of the reasons
that the license between Novell and Microsoft was so troubling to the
open source community was its negative impact on expectations that
open source norms would continue to govern open source software.
Patents covering open source software provided Novell with an opportunity for significant private commercial gain, leading to a defection from open access norms. Not surprisingly, additional license
deals between Microsoft and other open source software companies
followed in the wake of the Novell deal.207 Without the backing and
defensive patenting of large companies like IBM, such defections
might have led to unraveling of cooperation and the future of Linux
might have been questionable. While Linux survived, this survival
has come at a high cost, both in terms of centralized corporate control
over development paths and the costs of defensive patenting. Application of this proposed principle would have limited the ability of
Novell or any third party acquirer to obtain injunctive relief or damages from the assertion of Novell’s open source patents against the
open source community. This would have made the patents less
commercially attractive and reduced Novell’s incentives to defect.
In the context of Foldit, the commitment of the Foldit administrators and Foldit players to ensuring that scientific discoveries and the
206. For a discussion of swift trust and its role in open source software communities,
see Part II.A.
207. See, e.g., Mary Jo Foley, Microsoft and SUSE Extend Microsoft’s Controversial
Novell Linux Pact, ZDNET (July 25, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/microsoft/
microsoft-and-suse-extend-microsofts-controversial-novell-linux-pact/10164; Paul Krill,
supra note 110.
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research tools that enable such discoveries are made publicly available is critical to its success. Members of Foldit are willing to freely
contribute their energy and ideas because they expect and believe
both that other participants will behave similarly and that the results of their collective efforts will be freely shared with each other
and with the scientific community. While defensive publishing of results may limit the ability of Foldit players to patent their discoveries, and claims of joint inventorship may limit the ability of any individual to obtain exclusive control, much of what the game members
contribute and share are software tools and problem solving techniques rather than the ultimate discovery. Moreover, the fact that
participants make their results public now does not mean that they
will continue to do so if commercial considerations play a larger
role.208 This additional protection is therefore necessary to protect
Foldit norms of open and free sharing.
2. Second Principle
The second principle is to limit the private appropriation of collective value by a patent owner, with the goal of supporting benefitsharing in contexts of cooperative innovation. The principle would
limit patent remedies where patents are used to hold up group production or extract rents from the group based on the group’s adoption
and collective use of the invention.209 While this is analogous to the
patent holdup concerns that arise when patents cover the use of
standards adopted by industry members, it is broader, encompassing
situations in which a group widely adopts and uses inventions that
further the innovation objectives of the group. Concerns about the
appropriation of collective value through patent holdup will be
strongest in situations where the cost of switching to another technology would be high and where the fact that the group has used the
patented invention has made it more valuable to the group and to
people outside the group. This principle would weigh strongly against
208. Similar considerations and concerns about the effects of patents on sharing have
arisen in academic science. Academic science is characterized by norms that support open
dissemination and use of research results. The more scientists can rely on these norms, the
more willing they will be to continue to share their own discoveries and to use and
experiment with the discoveries of other scientists, encouraging trust and reciprocity. These
norms are public knowledge, there are social benefits from encouraging reliance on these
norms, and it appears that many scientists do indeed rely on these norms. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19. But see Merges, supra note 68.
209. There is an extensive literature on patent holdup, and this principle adopts and
extends the recommendations that many patent scholars have made in the context of
patents covering one component of a larger product. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 195. But
see F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects from Different Approaches to
Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting Organizations, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091 (2013) (emphasizing importance of context but in this case
to limit the situations of patent holdup that deserve a patent remedy response).
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awarding injunctive relief where the value of a patented invention is
largely attributable to its widespread adoption and use by the
group.210 The interests of the group would nevertheless still be balanced against the interests of the patent owner, and the principle
will have most application for patents covering inventions that are
made by members of the group or third-party patent owners who collaborate with or directly benefit from the activities of the group. This
principle would also factor into the determination of damages by excluding the value that the patented invention has as a result of its
widespread adoption and use by the group.211
The principle will also limit patent remedies to account for the
benefits, if any, received by the patent owner from the group—
primarily but not exclusively patent owners who are members of the
group or who obtained their rights to the invention from a member of
the group. First, the group will have limited ability to patent and restrict use of inventions discovered by the group, making bargaining
with third-party patent owners and members of the group who defect
and patent their own inventions more difficult.212 Determining when
an invention has emerged, who the inventors are, and whether and
how patenting should be pursued, as well as handling negotiations
with a third party regarding use of their patented technology, can be
extremely difficult in contexts of massively distributed collective intellectual production. In addition, many systems of cooperative innovation rely on a set of beliefs that are not consistent with patenting
and enforcing patents. This puts the group at a disadvantage when

210. For a similar line of reasoning in the context of FRAND promises, see Jorge
Contrerras, supra note 200 (manuscript at 11-12).
211. This approach was adopted by Judge Robart in his modification of the GeorgiaPacific factors in the Microsoft v. Motorola decision. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 191.
Thomas Cotter and Norman Siebrasse have suggested an alternative way of thinking
about the ex ante hypothetical negotiation, focusing on the ex ante contingent value of
patented technologies that might be adopted as part of a standard and, if adopted, would
have higher value. This approach provides a way of thinking about a reasonable ex ante
negotiation that is not based on holdup value, but rather on the incremental contribution
that the patented technology makes to the standard as compared with the next best
alternative technology. See, e.g., Norman Siebrasse, Comments on Sidak Part 2: The Ex
Ante Contingent Value Approach (Siebrasse), COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/12/comments-on-sidak-part-2-ex-an
te.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Comments on Sidak, Part 3: Should a FRAND Royalty be
Higher than a Reasonable Royalty? (Cotter), COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/12/comments-on-sidak-part-3-shouldfrand.html. Comparing and evaluating alternative approaches and their implications for
contexts of cooperative innovation is left for further discussion.
212. This principle may actually make it even harder for the group to obtain their own
patents, making defensive patenting and licensing strategies harder. While I think that
the benefits of the principle will likely outweigh the costs in the contexts I am focusing on,
this potential cost should not be ignored.
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they are forced to pay for their use of a third party’s technology but
cannot charge for the use of their technology.
Second, the group will have limited ability to extract payment for
the use of its non-patentable contributions by either a group member
or a third party who obtains a patent covering an invention that was
discovered through the use of the group’s knowledge. As a result of
these limits, third parties or defectors from the group may be able to
capture the benefits of group production for free while extracting
payment for their own incremental contributions. Where a member of
the group is able to defect from the group, that is, patent and privately benefit from an invention that builds on the efforts of the group,
this erodes the group members’ trust that other members of the
group will adhere to its norms of sharing and reciprocity. Where the
incremental improvement is made and patented by a third party, the
result is less harmful to group dynamics but still increases the cost of
innovation for the group and reduces the incentives of the group
members to freely and openly share their ideas. If the patent can be
used to block the future efforts of the group or to extract rents from
the group through licensing, benefit-sharing is even more skewed,
and the transaction costs for participants in the cooperative project
increase. This problem is not unique to systems of cooperative innovation, but it is particularly harmful to them because it disrupts the
non-market mechanisms upon which they rely.
While existing patent law doctrines of derivation, joint inventorship and prior art significantly limit the ability of an individual to
patent inventions that utilize, borrow from, or build on group discoveries, these protections do not adequately address the following problems that patents create for group investments in intellectual production.213 One of the biggest limits of these existing patent law doctrines is their failure to remove the ex ante incentive problems that
are created when individual members of the group see chances to
limit their sharing of knowledge so as to increase the chances of their
own individual discovery and patenting for monetary gain. These
doctrines also do not address and protect many of the valuable contributions made by group members. Member contributions often take
the form of tools that increase the chances of invention but are not
themselves either patentable or prior art for the resulting invention.
In Foldit, for example, participants develop software programs that
help to increase scores in the game, and these programs, along with
observations about how to solve problems in game play, are some-

213. See supra Part II (discussion of limits of these doctrines in cooperative
innovation contexts).
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times shared among the players.214 Although the software programs
and strategies may increase the likelihood that a patentable discovery about proteins will be made, they do not themselves describe such
a discovery and therefore do not constitute prior art for such a discovery. The people contributing the programs are not joint inventors
of the resulting discovery. Moreover, although providing valuable information that increases the chances of a patentable discovery, it is
unlikely that the software programs or strategies for gameplay will
themselves be patentable discoveries.
Even where the doctrines do apply, they may be difficult and costly for the group to utilize. Where the group wants to challenge thirdparty inventorship claims on the grounds of joint inventorship or derivation, it is forced to undertake the costs of pursuing these claims
and may find it difficult to satisfy the evidentiary requirements under patent law despite the value of its contributions. The massively
distributed nature of the group and the importance of keeping transaction costs low similarly limit the usefulness of these doctrines. In
addition, where the group wants the value of its contributions reflected in negotiations for the use of third-party patents, it may be
forced to explore patenting, and this can be inconsistent with and potentially undermine group beliefs and values. Additional help from
the law is needed to fill these gaps and address these limits. In response to some of these gaps, I am suggesting that where a patented
invention benefits from the knowledge provided by the group, the
benefits received from the group should be considered and sometimes
limit the remedy that a patent owner receives.
This principle, like the first, builds on and finds support in existing proposals to address patent holdup by limiting the ability of
patent holders to obtain injunctive relief and by restricting what
can be included in the calculation of damages.215 It is also consistent
with recent court decisions in the context of standard-essential
patents that seek to limit patent damages to the value of the technology and exclude the value conferred by the standardization of this
technology.216 The principle goes further than these existing ap214. See Public-Shared Recipes, FOLDIT, https://fold.it/portal/recipes/public (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014).
215. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 19, at 1174-87 (explaining how patent law should
play a role in responding to, or enabling private parties to avoid, patent holdup); Lemley
& Shapiro, supra note 195 (explaining how patent law should be modified to respond
to problems of patent holdup and royalty-stacking, including limits on injunctive relief
and damages).
216. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *98101 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). There are also proposals designed to address patent
holdup in context of standard-setting. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever:
Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231 (2014) (suggesting combination of contract and property principles to govern FRAND commitments);
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proaches, however. It is not limited to technology standards and patents covering those standards, but instead applies when a group
adopts an invention as part of its research platform and this adoption
and use confers value on the invention. Where the value arising from
widespread adoption and use is large, this should be a factor weighing against injunctive relief, and this value should be excluded from
royalty calculations to the extent that the value reflects simply its
use as a standard. The principle also requires courts to look at
whether knowledge contributions from the group were instrumental
in leading to the invention. If the knowledge contribution was substantial, this should weigh against injunctive relief and should be
reflected in reduced royalties. In this way courts will play a role in
enforcing benefit-sharing and promoting fairness, making members
of the group more willing to participate and freely contribute their
work to the group.
This principle would play the strongest role in situations where
members of a cooperative innovation project, such as Linux or Foldit,
defect with an invention, patent it, and either seek to assert it
against the group or to assign it to a third party who then asserts it
against the group. In this case the combination of benefits from group
production and public interest in continued group use of the invention would weigh against injunctive relief and would substantially
limit royalties where the invention relates closely to the intellectual
production of the group. This principle would also extend, although
with less force, to limit patent damages where a third party who is
not a member of the group benefits from the intellectual production
of the group and/or seeks to hold up the production of the group. In
the Linux example, Novell and its assignees would have found it harder to enforce their patents against the open source community, and
knowing this, the open source community would have been less worried, and the patents would have been less valuable. Novell would
therefore have had less incentive to defect from the community in the
Merges & Kuhn, supra note 195 (arguing for a standards estoppel doctrine to check for
good-faith behavior by the patentee). As well, there are proposals designed to protect areas
of innovation that rely on free sharing of information. Strandburg, supra note 150. Alternative approaches have included improving incentives of private parties to agree through
limits on injunctive relief, mandatory arbitration, and other mechanisms for improving
private ordering. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to
Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47 (2013) (adapting patent pool approach to standard-setting organizations); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1135 (2013) (discussing a mandatory arbitration mechanism where owner of standardessential patent and standard implementer do not agree on FRAND terms); Timothy
Simcoe, Governing the Anti-Commons: Institutional Design for Standard Setting Organizations (July 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the National Bureau of Economic Research) (examining SSO practices and debates using Elinor Ostrom’s selfgoverning common pool framework).
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first place. Microsoft might have found its patent threats and licensing
strategies less effective, reducing the need for defensive patenting.
This principle could limit incentive problems in Foldit as well.
Foldit members will have less incentive to use patents opportunistically and will be more willing to continue to volunteer their efforts
without compensation if they all know that the contribution of ideas
by the group will factor heavily in determining remedies for any invention made and patented by a group member. This principle will
also limit the ability of third parties with inventions that build upon
or are heavily utilized by the group to the benefit of the patent owner
to obtain injunctive relief and damages from these infringing uses.217
The key challenge in employing this principle is to provide the
courts with tools or specific guidelines for how to identify and value
these contributions. Indeed, concerns with the ability of the courts to
measure the contribution of an invention to a larger product or project have stalled changes in patent remedies in the past. Courts are
now confronting and finding ways to navigate analogous measurement problems, however, in the context of determining reasonable
royalties for standard-essential patents.218 This provides a starting
point for courts seeking to take into account the value of group
knowledge contributions and group use when assessing patent damages.219 In the hypothetical negotiation of a license to a patented invention, the court would consider not just the value of the patented
technology but also the value of the intellectual contributions of the
cooperative innovation community. In this hypothetical exchange, the
contributions from the group would reduce the royalty owed to the
patent owner. In addition, royalties to the patent owner would exclude any value that the invention has as a result of its widespread
adoption by the group. This hypothetical licensing negotiation should
reflect the reduced bargaining power of the patent owner where injunctive relief is unlikely, and the increased bargaining power of the
group where they are providing value through their activities.

217. This approach could also address the practical limits of prior art and derivation
doctrines by presuming that the community has some rights over the invention, leaving the
patent owner with the burden of showing that the invention did not benefit from
community production and did not derive its value from adoption by the community as a
standard technology.
218. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 19, at 1180-88; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1994 (2007); Mark A. Lemley,
Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV.
149, 153 (2007).
219. How royalties should be determined in this context is an area in which the law
and commentary are in flux. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I:
Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931 (2013); Cotter, supra note 211.
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3. Third Principle
The third principle is to reinforce reciprocity in free, open systems
of innovation.220 This principle would treat both formal and informal
rules governing open access and sharing of ideas and discoveries as
commitments by participants to share their own contributions with
other participants in the project. Where discoveries relevant to free
and open source projects are made by members of the project, free
and open access and use of the discoveries by the group should be
presumed unless the members of the group have explicitly agreed
otherwise. In this way the law reinforces informal rules and norms of
reciprocity and reduces the payoffs from defecting from group
norms.221 Provided that people know about this change in the law in
advance, it makes it easier for members of the group to commit to
behavior in compliance with these rules and norms, in addition to
facilitating ex ante bargaining. The principle would also apply to limit relief for industry members who know about and maybe even benefit from the use of their invention by the cooperative innovation project unless these parties have taken reasonable precautions to put
the community on notice of their proprietary rights before the invention is in use. Where third parties develop inventions that rely on
the work done by an open source project and relate to the open source
project, this principle would weigh heavily against allowing this third
party to block the use of the discovery by the group, either through
an injunction or royalties that are not feasible for group participants
to pay. The impact of this principle should become larger the closer
the relationship of the patent owner to the group and the greater the
benefit to the patent owner of the group’s activities.
Open access and reciprocity play critical roles in both open source
software and crowd science projects.222 In cooperative systems such as
these, discoveries that benefit from the productive efforts of the
group should be available for use by the group at either no cost or,
where the discovery is made outside of the project, at a cost that is
reasonable in light of the competing interests and investments of the
group and the patent owner. Efforts have been made to build reciprocity into open source communities through the use of licenses such

220. For thoughts on motivating reciprocity, see, for example, Stephen Leider
et al., Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks, 124 Q.J. ECON.
1815 (2009).
221. For a related idea on how open source systems can reduce opportunism in the
context of open standards, see, for example, Vetter, supra note 96.
222. See, e.g., Jane Kaye et al, Data Sharing in Genomics—Re-Shaping Scientific
Practices, 10 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 331 (2009); Jennifer C. Molloy, The Open Knowledge
Foundation: Open Data Means Better Science, 9 PUB. LIBR. SCI. BIOLOGY 1.
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as the General Public License and the Reciprocal Public License.223
These contracting approaches are generally limited to the world of
free and open source software, however, and questions about the enforceability and transaction costs associated with these licenses remain.224 Large public funding agencies such as the National Institute
of Health have sought to build reciprocity into public funding requirements, but again with high transaction costs and questionable
enforceability.225 The principle that I propose can complement these
efforts. It can also expand upon them, applying in situations where
there is no contractual privity and without depending upon the organizational structure that underpins open source software production or publicly funded research.
In the Foldit context, this principle would limit the ability of both
members of Foldit and third parties to impede the free use of scientific discoveries by Foldit members for the non-commercial purposes
of solving Foldit puzzles. It would thus operate in ways that are
analogous both to proposed concepts of patent fair use and proposals
for research use exemptions, but in both cases limited to the context
of crowd science.226 This principle would be most valuable in sustaining non-mainstream, volunteer-based open source projects, which are
among the most vulnerable to transaction costs and the least able to
engage in defensive patenting activities.
All three of these principles draw from a rich body of research that
critiques the lack of safe harbors within patent law for publicly beneficial uses of patented technology, particularly where the patented
technologies have been created through the use of public funds.227
The patent literature includes a number of carefully constructed proposals for research use exemptions and patent fair use.228 Instead of

223. See, e.g., Reciprocal Public License 1.5 (RPL-1.5), OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (July
15, 2007), http://opensource.org/licenses/rpl-1.5; see also Tom Hall, Open Source—
Reciprocal Licenses, TECH L. GUY BLOG (Sept. 18, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://techlawguy.blog
spot.com/2013/09/p-margin-bottom-0.html (including a list of reciprocal open source
licenses as determined by GNU).
224. See, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 107 (examining the most recent version of
general public license that tries to deal with issues such as patents and digital rights
management); Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1.
225. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of
Federally Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 953 (2012).
226. See, e.g., Joshua I. Miller, Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Some of Patent Law,
2 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 56 (2011); O’Rourke, supra note 151; Strandburg, supra note 150.
227. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 150 (arguing for the use of defenses and
exemptions from infringement as a way of responding to the fact that different uses of
patented technology can have different social costs and benefits).
228. See id.; see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has
the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (proposing research-use defense that
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focusing on the types of uses, however, the focus here is on preserving non-market mechanisms for cooperative innovation. Moreover,
the principles are not intended as rules that dictate particular patent
remedies, but rather as mechanisms for expanding the range of interests that courts are required to think about when fashioning patent remedies.229 These principles require courts to systematically
take into account the broader costs of patents on socially beneficial
cooperative innovation when fashioning patent remedies.230 Ideally,
the principles would also be adopted by agencies such as the Federal
Trade Commission, the Department of Justice and the International
Trade Commission, and used to guide future changes in the patent
statute made by legislators.231 The principles provide a focal point for
all of these patent policymakers to use when fashioning their responses to patent problems in contexts of cooperative innovation.
V. CONCLUSION
“Many ideas grow better when transplanted into another mind than
the one where they sprang up.”—Oliver Wendell Holmes

Cooperative innovation can bring together diverse perspectives
and ideas and harness underutilized human resources in new ways
to solve previously intractable scientific problems. In some cases, systems of cooperative innovation that rely at least partially on nonmarket mechanisms may complement existing modes of marketdriven innovation. In other cases, they may challenge incumbent systems of intellectual production and intensify competition in ways
that accelerate scientific and technological progress. The potential of

distinguishes between situations requiring payment and those not requiring payment, with
a focus on protecting robust domain for basic research uses); O’Rourke, supra note 151, at
1204-05; Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81.
229. But see, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (stating the idea that propertization of patent
rights can lead to the narrowing of IP, providing for limits based on development,
necessity, and equity).
230. Efforts have been made to provide general principles or principles for determining
patent remedies. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Remedies and Practical Reason, 88
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 125 (2010); Golden, supra note 18. I am not providing principles
that govern the application of remedies generally, but rather specific principles that
require policymakers to consider the effects of patent remedies on the viability of
cooperative innovation.
231. The patent statute provides little guidance for courts in how they determine
patent remedies, leaving the implementation primarily to common law. I focus on the role
of the courts in responding to cooperation through their approach to patent remedies,
utilizing the ability of courts to operate through what Burk and Lemley have termed
“policy levers.” See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575 (2003).
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these emerging systems of innovation may be limited, however, by
patent roadblocks.
This Article has shown that patents may sometimes interfere with
important non-market mechanisms that sustain systems of cooperative innovation by increasing both the costs of participating and the
benefits of defecting from these systems. While some forms of open,
collaborative innovation persist in the face of patent threats, they do
so only at great cost and with uncertainty about their future sustainability. To these costs and uncertainties we must add the social loss
from potentially valuable innovation paths foreclosed.
In response to these concerns, I suggest that courts and other patent policymakers need to pay more attention to the ways in which
patent law may systematically disadvantage cooperative innovation.
As a starting point, I take advantage of current areas of opportunity
in judicial thinking about patent remedies to propose modest changes
in the ways that courts implement patent remedies where nonmarket mechanisms of cooperation are important. Three principles
are provided to guide courts in their determinations of patent remedies with cooperative contexts in mind. The principles are intended to
support cooperation where patents are not already accomplishing
this goal, and only to the extent that patents are impeding this goal.
Limiting the negative incentive effects of patents on non-market
mechanisms in this way may give cooperative innovation systems
chances to complement and to compete against market-driven systems of innovation. In addition, a greater legal commitment to balancing individual interests with broader public interests in cooperative innovation may improve the relationships that cooperative innovative communities have to patent law. Implementing patent law in
ways that take the interests and needs of these communities into account may move us closer towards a patent system that can accommodate alternative paradigms of innovation.

